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Executive Summary - The End of the Intel Era
Today, Intel is nearly synonymous with computers. In the past thirty years nearly
all personal computers and the great majority of servers have shipped with a
processor based on Intel's x86 architecture, of which Intel is the dominant vendor.
Yet the past few years have seen a subtle yet remarkable convergence of different
industry trends that very well may topple the semiconductor giant.
For the past three decades, computers have largely assumed the same shape and
form, regardless of their task. Laptops, desktops, and servers have all been based on
the same open modular architecture established by IBM. Yet this is not likely to be
the case going forward. The past decade has seen the rise of embedded computing,
perhaps best epitomized by smartphones and tablet computers.
Instead of the standard PC architecture where individual components can be easily
exchanged, embedded devices are typically modular designs with highly integrated
physical components. Independent functional units, all designed by independent
companies, are integrated onto the same piece of silicon to achieve system cost and
performance targets. Instead of a standard x86 processor, each device category
likely has a chip optimized for its specific application.
At the same time that the form of computing is changing, we are witnessing a
redistribution of where computing power resides with Cloud Computing and data
centers. These have ordinarily been the province of Intel based machines, but data
centers have moved from using standard off-the-shelf PCs to custom designed
motherboards. Again, we are seeing a shift from the modular personal computer
architecture to one that is customized for the task at hand.
Another concern for Intel is that the standard metrics by which products compete
are in flux. For both embedded systems and data centers, the operational costs and
constraints are starting to outweigh the initial outlay costs. An example is the
industry shift from overall performance to system power efficiency. Intel has been a
relentless driver of processor performance, and this is a significant change of focus
for its R&D divisions.
Of all Intel's competitors, ARM best represents the magnitude of these challenges for
Intel, and is well positioned to take advantage of all these trends. Their business
model of licensing their design is well suited for a world with customized
architectures, and their extensive experience in low power embedded devices has
given them an advantage over Intel in processor power efficiency.
Intel is heavily invested in its existing vision of the market. They have always
maintained a manufacturing process advantage through tremendous investments in
new foundries, and have long championed the open PC modular architecture. Time
will ultimately show if Intel is capable of meeting these growing challenges. Yet it is
clear that in order to do so, it must make radical changes to itself. One may ask if it
is even the same company that emerges.
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Chapter 1 - Why Intel Must Chance
Intel's dominance can be traced back to 1981, when IBM first introduced the
personal computer. Since then Intel has dominated the processor segment of
personal computing and achieved a success that few other companies have matched.
In the past thirty years nearly all personal computers and the great majority of
servers have shipped with a processor based on Intel's x86 architecture, of which
Intel is the dominant vendor.
Yet the past few years have seen a subtle yet remarkable convergence of different
industry trends that very well may topple the semiconductor giant. Not only does
Intel find itself technologically behind an unexpected competitor, its very business
model is threatened.
The challenges to Intel are threefold. First, the metric of competition has shifted
from CPU performance to power efficiency, which is something Intel has not had to
have as its primary focus in the past. Second, the design of chips is becoming more
modular while the chips themselves are integrating a wider variety of functionality.
This is an inversion of Intel's tradition of designing an integrated CPU and selling it
into a modular system. Finally, Intel is at a significant disadvantage in a business
ecosystem of licensed modular design and the commoditization of semiconductor
fabrication, as its organizational structure and size is predicated on the sizable
profit margins it makes from high performance processors and the co-specialization
of design and manufacturing.
Intel
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Figure 1 - Integrated Design and Modular Components Versus Modular Design and Integrated
Components
In order to survive, Intel will likely need to shape itself into a fundamentally
different company. In November 2010, Intel announced that it would allow
Achronix to use its foundries1. This marks the first time Intel has produced chips for
another company, and is perhaps a sign that Intel recognizes that radical change is
1 http:, //www.eetimes.com/electronics-news/4210263 /Intel-to-fab-FPGAs-for-
startup-Achronix. observed on March 7, 2010.
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necessary. There are now also rumors afoot that it will compete to manufacture
some high volume ARM chips for Apple 2.
Despite the myriad of tasks that computers are used for, the number of different
form factors is remarkably small. Client and consumer devices can broadly be
thought of as desktops and laptops (and arguably net-books as well). Servers can
generally be categorized by processing power into small, medium, and large,
determined by the number of processor sockets they have (Gillett, 2010).
Furthermore, these different form factors all have nearly identical internal system
architectures, based on an open, modular design championed by Intel. The physical
components of the system are interchangeable, and a PC firm can replace one
vendor with another without significantly changing the design of their system. The
only constant is an x86 processor and the Windows operating system, hence the
term "Wintel." In essence, we have a massive industry served by a handful of
different product lines, all based on the same open modular system architecture.
This has resulted in Intel being able to serve an enormous market with only a
handful of different processors. Instead of product diversity, they have focused on
manufacturing excellence and the inherent performance advantages that can be
found in smaller and smaller process geometries. If we measure CPU performance
against cost (MIPS / $), Intel has relentlessly improved this metric year over year,
directing all their resources and innovation towards it. This is a strategy that has
served them well and is perhaps best epitomized by Moore's Law, the famous
observation made by Intel co-founder Gordon Moore that the number of transistors
on a chip doubles every two years.
2 Barak, Slyvie. "Could Intel Churn out ARM chips for Apple?" RCR Wireless. May 4
2011 < http://www.rcrwireless.com/article/20110504/CHIPS/110509966/0 >
Observed May 6, 2011.
Yet the landscape of computing is changing. Instead of laptops, desktops, and
servers we see the advent and ascent of smartphones and now tablet computers.
Few will argue that these types of devices are not poised to grow significantly. The
market research firm IDC estimates that smartphones outsold PCs for the first time
in Q4 2010.3 But the change extends beyond just smartphones and tablets.
Everyday devices are beginning to come equipped with significant processing
power. The list is long and varied: automobiles, televisions, printers, routers,
handheld gaming devices, e-books, cell-phones, digital cameras, etc...
While the personal computer and server market has a well-established and
inherently modular architecture that has benefited Intel, the embedded devices
market is populated by a myriad of different architectures. Each application has its
own set of size, weight, and cost-performance constraints and challenges, which in
turn impose tough tradeoffs between performance and other features. This has
given rise to System on a Chip (SoC) based solutions, which allow embedded devices
manufacturers to both reduce system costs and have a solution highly customized to
their use-case.
These SoC designs pull multiple functions onto the same piece of silicon. Instead of
reserving the entire die for the processor, SoCs incorporate other system support
functions, such as a memory controller, as well as application specific logic, such as a
wireless modem or an ink-jet print head controller. In essence, we have a trend of
modular designs but highly integrated physical components.
Embedded devices also have different power considerations than traditional PCs.
Many of these devices are portable, mobile devices that are disconnected from the
power grid and have to run off a battery. Unfortunately, there is no Moore's Law for
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batteries, and adding more processing power to a smartphone can come at the cost
of a shortened operational period. While the processing power of a smartphone is
certainly an important design parameter, the mobility requirements far outweigh it.
Few people would use a mobile device that had to be recharged every hour. Across
a wide variety of market segments, we can see the focus shifting from CPU
performance to CPU energy efficiency.
At the same time that the form of computing is changing, we are witnessing a
redistribution of where computing power resides with Cloud Computing. Cloud-
based services can bring new functionality to consumers without requiring them to
purchase new devices. Cloud computing has the potential to aggregate our
computing power requirements and ultimately reduce the need for raw CPU
horsepower in individual devices. Instead of a PC for every desktop, the future will
likely be a smartphone or a tablet paired with cloud-based services for every
person.
These changes also reinforce the aforementioned shift to CPU energy efficiency.
Cloud computing is aggregating the processing needs of countless people into large
data centers and server farms. And despite the role of data centers as providers of
computing cycles, the cost of processor computing cycles has fallen to where these
data centers are more concerned with the operating costs associated with
processing, namely cooling and electricity requirements, than with the capital
investment required to add more processing power.
Cloud computing has been around longer than the personal computer, but it is only
recently that it has reached mass-market adoption as a result of better connectivity.
Nearly every tablet computer sold has a network connection of some kind, and
network connectivity is one of the defining features of smartphones. This has the
dual effect of emphasizing the importance of network connectivity in devices while
also deflating the need for processing power for the individual. In short, macro-
level changes in consumer behavior are inflicting change onto the micro-level
architecture of devices.
Perhaps the company that best embodies this convergence of threats to Intel is ARM
Holdings. ARM Holdings is the developer of the ARM architecture, which is the
dominant processor in the embedded devices market. If the future of computing
devices truly stems from embedded devices, then ARM stands to benefit simply
because of its market share. But this is a threat that runs deeper that simple market
positioning.
There are three reasons why ARM is of particular concern to Intel.
First is the rising concern with operational costs of a system over the upfront costs.
This manifests itself as an industry shift from a performance-cost tradeoff (MIPS/$),
to a performance-energy efficiency tradeoff (MIPS/Watt). For several decades, Intel
has created processors with higher and higher performance, and all the while
driving down costs lower. Yet now that customers care about MIPS per Watt, it is
ARM who has the advantage. In many ways, this is a classic Christensen disruption
from below.
The second concern is the aforementioned trend of modular design but integrated
physical components. Intel has made its fortune off serving the PC and server
market with a handful of products. In a market where we have a plethora of
customized and integrated components, Intel can no longer rely on its
manufacturing volume. Moreover, when the design is modular, ARM's business
model of licensing its processors to SoC designers allows it to be a critical part of
any design, regardless of how customized or integrated it is. Firms can design the
portion of their system that needs to be customized themselves, and then simply
license an ARM processor to complete the system. Intel is not an option, because
they neither offer a product that can address a particular niche, nor can they license
their x86 processors into that design.
The Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) costs associated with chip design have
steadily risen year after year. For companies that would seek to make a custom chip
for their product, it would at first appear that the NRE would be prohibitively high.
There puts tremendous pressure on design teams to only to focus their engineering
efforts on areas where they can cost effectively differentiate themselves from their
competitors. In crude terms, there is good NRE, which is the creation of unique
designs with value that attract customers, and there is bad NRE, which is
engineering effort that creates something that is redundant in the market but is
necessary. A modular design ecosystem allows companies to simply license IP for
what would otherwise be 'bad' NRE. A modular design ecosystem, with ARM as the
dominant processor core vendor, enables companies to entertain using customized
chips.
Finally, we must question if the market of the future can support an integrated
company of Intel's size. Intel is a company of $100 Billion market cap because it has
created a tremendous amount of value with its manufacturing capabilities. Intel's
business model is predicated on processor design being tightly coupled with
fabrication processes, which requires tremendous investments in process research
and development and massive capital expenditures in fabrication equipment. Intel's
business model is size. This is largely responsible for the performance
improvements we have seen over the last three decades. Yet companies like TSMC
are commoditizing the manufacturing of semiconductors and are willing to live off
thinner margins. They generally lag behind Intel in process size, but it is not clear
that this will continue to segment the market. While smaller process geometries
have brought lower power consumption in the past, we are reaching a point where
increased leakage current will attenuate these gains. If manufacturing excellence is
no longer a competitive advantage, can Intel capture the requisite value to justify its
size? Even if Intel is successful in matching ARM on energy efficiency and device
integration, it may need to radically change itself in order to survive.
The differences between Intel and ARM Holdings go beyond simple market position.
These are companies with two fundamentally different business models. Intel has
82,500 full-time employees and a Market Cap of $119.66 Billion 4 while ARM
Holdings has 1,861 employees and a Market Cap of $11.08 Billion.5 In 2009, Intel
had revenues of approximately $35.1 Billion and an operating income of $5.7
Billion6 . In the same year, ARM reported revenues of $463.8 Million and an
operating income of $73.8 Million7 . In engineering terms, Intel's x86 architecture is
a CISC-based architecture (Complex Instruction Set Computer) while the ARM
architecture is RISC-based (Reduced Instruction Set Computer). And finally the
business models are radically different Intel fabricates its own semiconductors, and
is heavily invested in its operations. In contrast, ARM Holdings manufactures
nothing and instead licenses its design out to other semiconductor companies.
This thesis will strive to answer the question - what will happen to Intel? - and is
divided into three sections. Part I, spanning chapters 3, 4, and 5, is a survey of the
academic frameworks used when writing this thesis. Chapter 3 covers the topics of
radical innovation, dominant design, and disruptive innovation. In broad terms, it
explores how industries have patterns of innovation that evolve as an industry
matures, and the phenomenon of disruptions, where high performance technologies
are disrupted by lower performing alternatives. These are useful frameworks to
help dissect the conflict between Intel, an industry stalwart who played a crucial
role in the birth of the PC industry, and ARM, whose expertise is in cell phones and
the embedded space.
The nature of the differences between Intel and ARM are largely architectural
differences. This is not the difference between cars and horse-drawn carts. Both
companies are in the process of designing integrated circuits. Architectural
4 http-//finance.yahoo.com /q?s=INTC. observed on January 25, 2011.
s http://finance.ahoo.com/q?s=ARMH observed on January 25, 2011.
6 Intel 2009 Annual Report.
7ARM 2009 Annual Report, converted to dollars using historical exchange rate on
December 31, 2009.
innovations have their own characteristics and can depart from much of the
conventional wisdom. Chapter 4 investigates the concept of architectural
innovation and the role of modularity in enabling rapid change.
Finally, after understanding the nature of the challenge to Intel, the logical extension
is to explore the managerial consequences. The stakes are frighteningly high for
companies faced with technological transitions, and history is littered with
examples of organizations that failed to navigate the challenge. Chapter 5 is about
the survival of incumbent firms when faced with dramatic change, and focuses on
the highly opposite stories of IBM and the Polaroid Corporation.
Part II is a retrospective of the computing industry since the advent of the PC. I
begin with the PC because the arrival of the PC was the last major revolution in the
computing industry, and is responsible for much of the industry structure that have
today. Chapter 6 begins Part II with a narrow focus and covers technological
trajectories and significant innovations in processor architecture and design. In
Chapter 7 the focus broadens to the PC market and traces the drivers behind the
PC's spectacular success and its growth into new market after new market. The PC's
success has been absolute, and what began as a hobbyists' toy now dominates
nearly all forms of computing.
In Chapter 8, I look at the semiconductor industry ecosystem as a whole. This
chapter touches on a variety of topics, including the industry structure, the
dominant cost-performance metrics of the PC era. I spend some time exploring the
massive challenge presented by the Power Wall, the escalating costs associated with
building a foundry, and how Intel's business model is running out of runway, even
without the challenge from ARM. Finally, Chapter 8 ends with a discussion of ARM,
System on a Chip designs, and the rise of independent foundries.
Part III is a prediction of future trends. Chapter 9 focuses on technology and the
trajectories of computing and how they will depart from past trends. The chapter
highlights moves towards diverse product architectures, as opposed to the PC
monoculture and the emergence of cloud computing as a significant force. In
Chapter 10, I investigate the design constraints in two intensely important markets
laid out in Chapter 9, namely smartphones and data centers. Finally in Chapter 11, I
lay out the challenges Intel faces in the present and future computing ecosystem at
large and why ARM is positioned to thrive.
Chapter 2 - Motivation and Terminology
So why write a thesis on Intel? My fascination with processors dates back to my
undergraduate education. (If we want to pinpoint when my interest with computers
began, we would have to dig far deeper). My chosen Major was Electrical
Engineering and within that my concentration was Computer Architecture. One of
the benefits of my curriculum was that I emerged from college with an
understanding of how a computer works from the operating system all the way
down to the physics of a metal oxide transistor.
Bar none, my favorite classes were the two I took on processor design. In my junior
year, my classmates and I recreated a PDP-8 processor using FPGAs. My senior
year, the project was to turn a single-issue RISC core into a dual-issue superscalar
processor. I was utterly taken with the simple elegance of RISC-based designs. At
the time, it made a significant impression on me that something that I considered to
be an example of sophisticated engineering was largely an afterthought in the
general purpose computing market by the year 2000. It was my first lesson that
there was more to processors than good engineering.
After I graduated college in 2001, I went to work for Sun Microsystems. I was part
of a gigantic project designing an Ultra Sparc V mainframe. In particular, I was
working on the chipset outside of the processor. It was my first introduction to
ASICs and logic design that was tailored for specific tasks rather than running
software. Unfortunately, my time at Sun coincided with the fallout from the dotcom
bust, and I was introduced to another reality of life in high tech - layoffs.
In mid 2004 1 joined a small fabless semiconductor company called Oasis
Semiconductor, which made chips for ink-jet printers. Because Oasis was so small, I
was able to see far more of the company than I was ever able to at Sun. At Oasis, I
saw the power of System on a Chip designs, and the vibrancy. It was also my first
introduction to ARM processors. The realization that you could simply license a
core rather than designing your own microcontroller was an epiphany for me. The
elegant simplicity of ARM's business model struck me much in the same way that
RISC processors did.
When I left oasis in 2010, I had an understanding that ARM was well established and
would continue to do well. However, my studies at MIT have made me realize just
how quickly dramatic change can sweep an industry. Violent change seems to come
periodically, albeit with long periods of stability. This is similar to the evolutionary
biology theory of punctuated equilibrium, where evolutionary change happens in
short intense periods, followed by relative stability1 . Intel and x86 had been
synonymous with computing as long as I could remember. When I left college, I
could not conceive of them ever being displaced. Yet as I reflected on my
undergraduate and professional experience through the lens of what I have studied
in the last year and a half, it has become apparent to me that we are in the midst of a
change as dramatic as the introduction of the personal computer.
This thesis is my attempt to document and outline the scope of this change, and
show why we are witnessing the end of the Intel Age.
Categorization and Terminology
After completing my first draft of this thesis, it was pointed out to me that I use
terms and phrases liberally that might be confusing to someone who does not have a
background in semiconductors. Before I get too far into this thesis, I will attempt to
provide some clarification for the reader. Let me begin with Semiconductors and
the Semiconductor Industry. 'Semiconductors' is a shorthand way of referring to
circuits, both analog and digital, integrated onto a single piece of silicon. I use
'Integrated Circuit' as a synonym for Semiconductor.
I Wikipedia. < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punctuated equilibrium > Observed
May 8, 2011.
Three other terms that I use interchangeably are Microprocessor, CPU (Central
Processing Unit), and Processers. In the original commercial IBM mainframes, a
processor was constituted of several individual components, but when Intel
invented the microprocessor, the entirety of the processor was integrated onto a
single piece of silicon. This is very much the norm now, so while it is technically
incorrect, I use these terms interchangeably.
There is an important distinction to make between a chip and a processor. In my
mind, a chip constitutes an integrated circuit, including its final packaging. Intel
makes a variety of chips, which constitute nothing other than a processor. But chip
and processor are not synonymous with each other. A chip can be any integrated
circuit, and is not limited to processors. In addition, a processor can be integrated
with other functional circuits on a single chip, which is known as a System on a Chip.
To confuse things further, I often frequently refer to processor cores. This is a term
that has risen with era of multi-core designs or System on a Chip designs, where the
processor is only a part of the overall design. A processor core is a stand-alone
processor, but is intended to be integrated with other circuits, be it additional
processor cores or other functional circuits. A multi-core chip is an integrated
circuit that has two or more processors inside of it.
There are a handful of other terms that are used throughout this thesis. 'Die' is
another way of referring to the physical silicon that a circuit lives on. A wafer is a
circular piece of silicon that fabrication processes are built around. They vary in
size, but the current standard is 300 mm in diameter. Once fabrication is complete,
the dies are cut from the wafer for individual chips. After being cut, the chips are
then packaged into their ceramic packaging that most people would recognize when
they look at the circuit boards inside their computers.
Finally, I need to clarify what I mean by Embedded Computing. An embedded
computer is a computer system that is generally crafted to a specific task, and is only
one part of an overall product rather than the product itself. While a consumer may
shop for a 'computer,' they do not go to the mall with the intent to buy an
'embedded computer.' Instead, they purchase a cell phone, a car, a printer, a
microwave, a router, a television, an e-book, or any other number of devices. But an
embedded computer is a critical component of each and every one of these devices.
Most consumers do not realize the ubiquity of embedded computers, but our daily




Chapter 3 - Dynamics of Innovation
The next three chapters will discuss existing academic work that I found particularly
helpful in my analysis of Intel and ARM. As we move to a discussion of the PC
industry in the next section, the Abernathy-Utterback model helps explain the
differences between the Intel of 1981 and the Intel of 2011, and Christensen
Disruption helps illustrate how a relatively small company like ARM can be so
dangerous. In Chapter 4, 1 explore the concepts of Architectural Innovation and
modularity in Design Rules, which I feel are the appropriate lenses to examine what
ARM is doing differently. Chapter 5 discusses the managerial challenges beyond
selecting the correct technology and strategy to compete. In short, failing to make
the requisite managerial changes in the face of technological discontinuities can
mean the end of an organization.
The Abernathy-Utterback Model and Dominant Design
The computer industry has a long history that is characterized by the rapid pace of
change. It would be a daunting task to try to track and understand every single
product or innovation introduced. Fortunately, there is an established body of
academic work that can help us understand the inner dynamics of innovation in
microprocessors.
The first model to discuss is the Abernathy - Utterback model, which characterizes
innovation in an industry as going through three successive phases: the fluid phase,
the transitional phase, and finally the specific phase (Abernathy, Utterback 1978).
As a starting point, it is helpful to map these three phases onto the traditional S-





Figure 2 A hypothetical performance curve and the 3 phases of the Abernathy-Utterback Model
The fluid phase is characterized by the entry of both new and established firms into
a market. The product category is likely new, and firms compete through product
differentiation and radical innovation. A salient example would be the US
automobile industry. From 1894 to 1918, 60 different firms entered the market,
and the total number of firms peaked at 75 in 1923 (Utterback, 1994). This time
period is populated by a number of radically different product designs, including
electric cars, steam cars, as well as the internal combustion engine car.
In contrast, the transitional phase is often marked by consolidation within the
industry. Using cars as the example again, between 1919 and 1941 a net of 44 firms
left the automobile industry (Utterback, 1994). In addition to the declining number
of competitors, the rate of product innovation typically drops off significantly.
Instead, the industry begins to shift its focus from radical production innovation to
process innovation and limits its R&D to a specific set of product features. As we
can see, the shift from the fluid to the transitional phase is a dramatic change and
begs the question of why does this occur?
Most often this change is attributable to the emergence of the dominant design. The
dominant design is the result of all the product innovation that occurs in the fluid
phase, and by definition "wins the allegiance of the marketplace." Once a dominant
design begins to emerge, it becomes increasing difficult for firms to compete
through product differentiation alone, as there are expectations in the marketplace
of what the product should be. To use the automobile example again, it is clear that
the dominant is design is the internal combustion engine car, and all the features
that are standard on cars today (windshield wipers, electric starters, seatbelts, etc.
... ) (Utterback, 1994)
It is important to note that the dominant design is not necessarily the product with
the highest performance, or greatest amount of functionality. It is determined by a
combination of technological and market forces, but can also be influenced by
factors such as standards, regulation and government influence.
The final phase in the Abernathy-Utterback model is the specific phase, and in many
ways extends the trends of the transitional phase. We see further consolidation,
often resulting in an oligopoly of a handful of firms sharing the market. The
dominant design is well defined, and the product category is heavily standardized.
Whatever product innovation occurs is mostly incremental innovation, and even the
manufacturing of products is fairly rigid, with well-defined supply chains and
distribution channels.
It is also important to note that the Abernathy-Utterback model also recognizes that
the different phases also have a strong influence on how an organization is
structured. For example, entrepreneurship is common in the fluid phase, while
project teams and task groups are more common in the transitional phase.
Companies in the specific phase are characterized by highly structured and rigid
organizational structures.
Christensen's Attack-From-Below Disruption
The stability of the specific phase leads directly into the next framework of interest,
Clayton Christensen's attack-from-below disruptive innovation described in The
Innovator's Dilemma. Christensen outlines a phenomenon where incumbent
organizations, who are well into the specific phase, can be well run and make all the
right decisions, yet still be overtaken in the market by lower performing
technologies.
The concept of disruption is a complex and dynamic idea, but it begins with the
recognition that technologies have performance trajectories. These trajectories are
almost always upward over time, as products improve performance year after year.
Some examples: with each generation of products hard drives add more storage,
semiconductors add more transistors, printers print at faster page rates, bicycles get
lighter and so on and so on.
Companies are rewarded for these trajectories when the market is segmented by
performance. Increasing product performance allows companies to reach more
lucrative segments of the market, and the market rewards companies that have
performance advantages over their competitors. These trajectories and
expectations of market behavior can embed themselves in an organization in a
myriad of ways. Competitive strategies, relationships with the customers,
organizational structure, market choices, and R&D capabilities are all optimized to
race further ahead in the technological trajectory. Christensen uses the term value-
network to describe this. The value-network drives companies to chase higher and
higher product performance and makes it hard for a company to behave in any
other way.
This sets the stage for one of the key ideas behind disruption: that the market's
supply of performance can overshoot customers' demand. When a disruption
occurs, a product attacks the incumbent firm "from below." That is to say that the
attacking product has lower performance on what has hitherto been the most
important attribute, but still enough to satisfy the needs of a given segment. As both
products meet the performance needs of a customer, the basis of competition begins
to shift to other dimensions.
This leads to another central idea in a disruption: the attacking product often has
superior performance in different dimension than the one along which the
established technology trajectory was measured. This is a subtle concept, and is
best demonstrated by the example of the hard drive industry used by Christensen.
Within a generation of hard drives, the performance trajectory was for increasing
storage space. Without fail, each successive market leader is disrupted by a product
with smaller storage space. But each disruptive product is also physically smaller,
allowing it to fit into smaller computers. The 14 inch hard drives were dominant in
the mainframe market, but 8 inch hard drives were able to take the minicomputer
market because while both technologies met the storage requires of minicomputers,
the 8-inch technology offered a superior form-factor.
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Figure 3 - Attack from below disruption
Disruptions sometimes catch companies by surprise, but they can be difficult to
avoid even if they are seen coming. The reason for this is the aforementioned value-
network, which establish overwhelming feedback mechanisms to keep companies
focused along existing performance trajectories. It is for this reason that
disruptions can be so dangerous to incumbent firms.
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Chapter 4 - Architecture. Modularity, and Innovation
Architectural Innovation
While the previous chapter focused on dynamics of innovation, the discussion only
differentiated between innovation in the product itself and innovation in the
process to create the product. To be sure, innovation is a multi-dimensional
phenomenon. In particular, this chapter will focus on innovations in the product
architecture and the challenges faced by organizations when a product's
architecture begins to change.
What is meant by architectural innovation? In the paper Architectural Innovation:
The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established
Firms, Rebecca Henderson and Kim Clark define architectural innovation as
"innovations that change the way in which the components of a product are linked
together, while leaving the core design concepts untouched" (Henderson and Clark,
1990). As that quote alludes, in this framework innovation can occur along two
dimensions: the aforementioned architectural innovations and innovations in the
core concepts.
In broad terms, this leaves us four types of innovation, shown in table 1 which is a





Core Concepts Core Concepts
Reinforced Overturned
Incremental Innovation Modular Innovation
Architectural Innovation Radical Innovation
Table 1
Radical innovation and incremental innovation are compatible with the views of
innovation discussed in the previous chapter. Radical innovation is diverse
experimentation with all the aspects of a product, ultimately resulting in a dominant
design. In the specific phase of an industry after a dominant design has been
established the most common type of innovation is incremental innovation.
Modular Innovation is also a straightforward concept. Henderson and Clark use the
example of replacing an analog phone with a digital one. The two phones are based
on significantly different technologies, yet they both have keypads, antennas,
speakers and microphones. In short, an analog phone and a digital phone are still
both phones. A similar example would be the recent switch to HDTV. From a
product standpoint, much of the technology has changed, yet the TVs all still have
the same categories of components (signal inputs, a screen, speakers, a power cord,
etc ... ).
Architectural innovation is more elusive concept. To recognize this type of
innovation, we must realize that knowledge and expertise in a specific technology or
component is altogether different than knowledge of how a technology or
component interacts with other technologies and components. For example, a
ceiling fan has many of the same components as a portable fan, such as an electric
motor and the fan blades. Yet how these components are connected in very
different ways, such as what the housing for the motor looks like. (Henderson and
Clark, 1990).
The main thrust of Henderson and Clark's paper is that this type of architectural
innovation presents a significant challenge to established firms. An established firm
will likely have relevant expertise for the new architecture, but they may not
understand how their knowledge is relevant. And in truth, their capabilities may
also blind them to critical changes in the new architecture. RCA was an industry
leader in transistors, radio circuits, and speakers, all critical parts of a transistor
radio, yet it was Sony who was the one who achieved market dominance.
(Henderson and Clark, 1990).
Why is this a challenge for established firms? In a market in the specific phase,
where the dominant design has been established, firms must be highly efficient to
survive. As the architecture of a product is stable, it can become "embedded" in the
organization. For example, a designer of televisions will likely have a screen design
team and a control electronics design team. This specialization is an effective way to
execute incremental innovation, and contributes to deep domain knowledge.
The way these different groups interact is also likely to be standardized and
optimized around the product design process for televisions. This creates
"information filters" within an organization. The screen design team and control
team will likely share information such as bandwidth and signaling requirements,
but not share with each other information such as thermals or size and weight.
These information filters are often necessary for high performing teams involved in
incremental innovation, as it helps to block out unnecessary distractions. In
summary, an organization can become like a mirror of the product it is designing,
both in its physical organization and its methodologies.
However as architectural innovations change the way components are connected,
they will likely be incompatible with these structures. The aforementioned
information filters can cause teams to not fully understand new critical interactions
in a new architecture. The internal processes that companies organizations rely on
to create high performing products can become a liability in the face of a change in
architecture. And even if an architectural change is fully understood by an
incumbent, it still has a significant handicap as organizational structure is painful to
uproot and rebuild while simultaneously trying to design a fundamentally different
product.
Design Rules & Modularity
One potent form of architectural innovation is the introduction of modularity in a
design. This is not to be confused with the aforementioned modular innovation.
Modular innovation refers to innovation within the components of an already
modular design. In Design Rules, Carliss Baldwin and Kim Clark discuss how
introducing modularity into a design, thereby innovating in its architecture, can
have profound effects on a products value and performance. These changes can be
so powerful as to reshape the entire competitive landscape.
Modularity can be used to make a system more flexible and adaptable, and allow a
market to rapidly find a system with the most value. Instead of a single monolithic
design, a modular design consists of separate components whose interactions are
defined by the systems "design rules." The core of Design Rules built around
identification of six operators that designers could use to create and modify a
modular system.
The first operator is splitting. Splitting is the first operation that must occur to
create a modular system. It is the act of separating functions that were previously
integrated together and having them both adhere to the same design rules which
allows them to interact. The second operation of substitution is simply replacing
one module with another. For example, a designer can replace a hard drive on
computer with one with entirely different performance specifications without
incurring significant economic costs. As long as the modules adhere to the same
design rules, substitution allows market forces to begin operating within a design.
Without splitting and substitution, market choice can only act on the system as a
whole.
The next operator is augmentation. Augmentation adds new modules to a system
and introduces new functionality. Exclusion is the inversion of augmentation, and is
the removal of a module from a system. Logically, the exclusion operator reduces
the functional range of a system. Again, all modules in a system must adhere to the
same design rules. A simple example would be the Swiss-Army knife. Adding a new
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Figure 4 Four of the Six Modular Operators
Inversion can be used when several different modules end up creating solutions to
the same problem repeatedly. Inversion creates a standard module to solve a
problem. For example, it is common in software to create a data-structure called a
linked list. Now most programming languages come with built in linked-list
modules for programmers to use. The term inversion comes from the act of a
designer bringing something from within a module up to a higher level for other
modules to use.
The final operator is porting, and in many ways is a logical extension inversion.
While inversion brought solutions the inner workings of a module to a higher level,
porting allows a module to be used in other systems. Using the words of Baldwin
and Clark, porting lets a module "breaks free" of the system. Tesla Motors first
designed its battery packs for use in the Tesla Roadster, but it ported its battery for
use in the Daimler Smart ED car'.
These six operators can lead to a number of different outcomes dizzying in their
variety. In complex systems, it is rare that a company understands fully how the
final system will perform - let alone how a market will receive its product. A
modular system allows designers to create a large number of different systems at a
relatively low cost. This higher rate of "experimentation" results in a higher
probability of a company will create a design that is of greater economic value.
Of particular relevance to this document is how introducing a modular design can
lead to modular clusters, which is a term Design Rules uses to describe a type of
industry structure. As a design shifts from an integrated monolithic design to a
modular based design, design efforts become decentralized. This decentralization
can evolve from separate design teams within a company to completely separate
organizations. In this type of industry structure, the design of a system is spread
over multiple independent firms, who sometimes are actively competing with each
other.
Carliss Baldwin and Kim Clark explore this idea further in the working paper
"Architectural Innovation and Dynamic Competition: The Smaller 'Footprint'
Strategy." By leveraging modularity, companies can focus themselves on the portion
of the design where they believe they can create the most value. Sun Microsystems
focused their design efforts on the interface they believed to be the performance
bottleneck, namely the interface between the CPU and memory and used standard
I Autoblog.com. January 13, 2009 < http://green.autoblog.com/2009/01/13/tesla-
confirms-smart-ed-battery-supply-deal/> Observed April 26, 2011.
modules for the rest of the design. With this approach they were able to outperform
systems designed by Apollo Computer, who designed nearly all aspects of their
product. Sun's smaller organizational "footprint" allowed them to not only build a
better product, but also be much more capital efficient while doing so. (Baldwin and
Clark, 2006) It is easy to see how modular clusters can create feedback loops and
allows small, networked organizations to create powerful systems quickly and
efficiently.
Modular clusters share a great deal of overlap with "business ecosystems." While a
review of the relevant literature of business ecosystems is outside the scope of this
thesis, a great discussion of the dynamics and powers of ecosystems can be found in
the articles "Strategy as Ecology" (Iansiti and Levien, 2004) and "Predators and
Prey: A New Ecology of Competition." (Moore, 1993)
The authors of Design Rules posit that this evolution is beyond the control of an
initial firm, and modular clusters can emerge despite the active efforts of the
originating firm to maintain control of the design. The modern computer industry,
itself a modular cluster, is a consequence of the decision by IBM to make
System/360 a modular design. It is truly striking when engineering decisions made
at the micro-architectural level can resonate to the point where a giant like IBM was
knocked from their perch.
Chapter 5 - Survival of the incumbent
There is nothing so captivating as the fall of the giant. There is no shortage of
analysis of why companies fail, and yet there is no widely accepted wisdom as to if
established incumbents have long-term advantages or if they doomed to eventual
failure. At this point, much of the work is anecdotal in scope, and only analyzes the
success or failure of individual companies rather than developing a common
framework. But if anything is clear, it is that companies can fail in a spectacular
variety of ways.
In all of this analysis, by far the most common question is "Was failure avoidable?"
Some of the academic work explored in chapters 3 and 4 would seem to suggest that
certain types of challenges are particularly difficult for companies to overcome:
architectural innovations may not be understood by the incumbent as their internal
structure filters out critical information flow; Clayton Christensen's book suggest
that an attack-from-below based disruption is nearly impossible for an incumbent to
beat back. But perhaps we need to separate the question of a company's failure in a
market from its overall failure.
The first example to investigate is perhaps the most famous turnaround story in
business today: Lou Gerstner's miraculous turnaround of IBM in the 1990s. In the
early 1990's, IBM's earnings were falling off a cliff. In 1991, IBM reported a loss of
$2.82 Billion, a dramatic swing from its earnings of over $6 billion the previous year.
In 1992 the losses nearly doubled to $4.96 Billion. And in 1993, the losses
ballooned to a staggering $8.1 Billion.1 While it dominated the mainframe market,
IBM's market dominance was being attacked by mini-computers and PCs. At the
same time, it was facing a critical technology change in its flagship product line, as
1 IBM Archives: 1990s < http:I/www-
03.ibm.com/ibm/historv/historv/decade 1990.html > Observed on March 28, 2011.
mainframes needed tor transition from bipolar designs to CMOS based designs
(Wladwasky-Berger, 2009)
A decades of avoiding layoffs, IBM cut 125,000 employees between the years of
1986 and 1993. It was at this point that the existing CEO John Akers resigned and
John Gerstner was selected to be his replacement. Throughout the 1990s Gerstner
transformed IBM from a hardware technology vendor to a broad-based solutions
and services provider (Harreld et al., 2007). There is no shortage of books and
articles on what IBM did to execute its turnaround, and Gerstner overhauled nearly
aspect of the business, from its internal accounting principles, to its advertising
strategies, to its product development. But it was the role of IBM's culture in its
turnaround that is perhaps the most broadly applicable.
Lou Gerstner was certainly a capable executive before he came to IBM but perhaps
the most notable qualification was the fact he was the first CEO to come from
outside IBM. In fact, this was a critical requirement of the job. When searching for
a new executive, the executive only considered candidates from outside the
company as the board "felt strongly that what was wrong with IBM couldn't be fixed
by an IBMer." (Garr, 1999, pg. 21) Why make this a requirement of the job?
Perhaps it was a tacit acknowledgement by IBM's board that its problems ran
deeper than poor strategic choices, and that the culture of the organization needed
to change as well.
In his first year on the job, Gerstner had to struggle with "malicious obedience,"
where the existing senior and mid-level managers would agree to anything he
suggested but would continue to operate in the manner they were used to. (Garr,
1999, pg. 71) To combat this, Gerstner made a series of moves and changes that
sent a clear and undeniable signal to IBM that the culture had to change. He forced
out senior managers who demonstrated that they were incapable of changing their
ways. He wrested power from IBM's successful foreign subsidiaries, and ousted
their senior executives who had long and successful track records. (Garr, 1999,
pg.72). Finally, he changed the bonus and incentive plan for the rank-and-file
employees, all of which was Gerstner's way of saying things must change and that
IBM would have standards accountability. (Garr, 1999, pg. 135)
Another potent example of the role of culture in an organizations ability to adapt is
the story of Polaroid. Unlike IBM, Polaroid was unable to overcome its challenges
and filed for bankruptcy in October of 2001.2 Polaroid's failure is often attributed to
its inability to transition from analog to digital photography. What is tragic about
Polaroid is that they were an early technology leader in digital photography. Their
Electronic Imaging Group was founded in 1981 and in 1992 they had a working
prototype of their PDC-2000 digital camera. However, the belief that Polaroid was a
film company was deeply ingrained in the management at Polaroid, and a product
that did not conform to the razor & blades business model, such as a digital camera,
struggled for executive support. As a result, the PDC-2000 was not released until
1996. What is remarkable is that even with the long delay, the PDC-2000 was still a
best in class digital camera, but at that point there were over 40 competitors in the
market and it failed to take off. (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000)
So why did Polaroid fail while IBM was able reverse its fortunes? There are
numerous differences between these companies, but perhaps it was the pace of
failure that is the critical difference. That is to say, IBM's earnings had plummeted
dramatically in the span of two years, which perhaps engendered a sense of crisis
that may have been lacking at Polaroid, who's failure played out over a decade. The
old anecdote of the frog in a boiling pot of water is an apt metaphor for this.
Finally, we must consider if failure of an organization is inevitable. The creation of
new firms and the failure of existing companies is an established tenet of business
today. With each challenge a company faces, it must ask if it could be the one that
2 CNN Money, "Polaroid files Chapter 11" <
http://money.cnn.com/2001 /10/12/companies/polaroid/ > Observed on March
29, 2011.
puts them out of business. In Organizational Ecology, Michael Hannan and John
Freeman use biological theory to explore the evolution of organizations. One
consequence of their work is the realization that just like in biological populations,
the death of an organization is highly correlated with its age. (Hannan and Freeman,
1989, pg. 245) There is no fountain of youth for companies. While we cannot say
with any certainty which organizations will survive and which will fail, it is clear
that giants like Polaroid, IBM, or even Intel must take any challenge seriously.
PART ||
The Past
Chapter 6 - A Brief History of Innovation and the PC
In this second part, I begin with the IBM 5150, the machine that signified the arrival
of the personal computer. Why start with the PC? In short, the advent of the PC was
the last major revolution in the computing industry, and is responsible for the
industry ecosystem we currently have. The revolution we are witnessing today in
many ways mirrors what started in 1981. As this is a thesis about Intel, this chapter
will focus in on technological trajectories and innovation in processors. In Chapter
7, I will trace the PC onslaught as it overtakes higher performing machines with
frighteningly regularity, and how much of that growth is due to innovations and
advances in processor performance. Chapter 8 will outline the challenges Intel
faces, and the Herculean efforts it must undertake to keep Moore's Law chugging
along. It will then pivot to ARM and System on a Chip semiconductor design, which
sets up the final third of this thesis.
The IBM 5150
While technically not the first Personal Computer, the release of the IBM 5150 in
1981 is widely recognized as the event that kick-started the PC industry1 . In a move
highly atypical of IBM, the 5150 used technology developed by outside companies,
shipping with the 8086 processor designed by Intel and an operating system
developed by Microsoft. In a strange twist of fate, Intel may owe its place the PC
business to Motorola. Before the 5150, IBM had a favored internal project that was
stumbling because Motorola was late in delivering the processor. In order to satisfy
a corporate deal with Sears, IBM created the 5150 as a stopgap and chose Intel to
supply the processor. (Jackson, 1997, pg. 203)
The 5150 project was a crash project through and through. To save time and money,
the IBM design team elected to use off the shelf parts and software rather than
I IBM Archives: 1981. < http:/www-
03.ibm.com/ibm/history/history/year 1981.html > Observed on March 30, 2011.
develop internally, as evidenced by the inclusion of Intel and Microsoft. ("Getting
Personal", Economist 2006) In turn, the Intel 8086 chip IBM selected was itself a
stopgap for Intel's iAPX432, which was a much delayed and troubled project. And
Microsoft purchased MS-DOS from a third company, where it was originally named
Q DOS, which stands for Quick and Dirty Operating System. (Jackson, 1997, pg 162,
205) Finally, IBM elected to make the specifications open to facilitate the
development of outside software. IBM had modest sales goals for the 5150, and
wanted to keep the development as low cost as possible.
Figure 5 -The IBM 51502
IBM's decision to build an open architecture for the PC and its "Big Blue" reputation
in the market turned out to be a fateful pairing. Although there were many firms
trying to grab a piece of the nascent PC market, IBM's entry was a legitimization of a
market that up until that point many people considered to be merely the province of
hobbyists. The founders of Compaq recognized that whenever IBM entered a
market, whatever it released became the standard. (Wilcox, 1998) As the 5150's
architecture was open, Compaq could simply buy the same off the shelf parts and
2 Image Source: Self-reliance-works.com < http://www self-reliance-
works.com/wp-content/uploads/201 1/01 /IBM-5150-PC.jpg> Observed May 8,
2011.
software and was able to create a software compatible machine within a year. After
this, the history of the PC one of a steady stream of IBM PC clones and diminishing
IBM fortunes. With a single product release, IBM had both defined the modern PC
and gave away the keys to the kingdom.
The Importance of Instruction Set Architectures
While much of the literature focuses on the significance of IBM outsourcing the
operating system of the 5150 to Microsoft, IBM's decision to use Intel's 8086
processor was equally important. In short, it allowed Intel to define the Instruction
Set Architecture (ISA) of the PC market. The ISA is a critical element of computer
architecture. It defines the interface between hardware and software. An ISA
defines a set of instructions and operations that a processor can interpret and
execute. All software is a string of these instructions, which when executed in order
create higher-level functions.
IBM first established the importance of the ISA with its System/360 mainframe.
(Lee, 2011) Without a stable ISA, software is not guaranteed to continue operating
correctly as it transitions from one generation of products to the next. And as the
body of software written grows for a particular product, so do the costs of switching
to a new product. IBM realized that a lack of software compatibility drove up costs
both for itself and for its customers, making it harder to sell them new products.
This is tremendously significant, and the System/360 represents the first time that
software was not exclusively co-specialized with the hardware. The concept of
backwards-compatibility had arrived.
The ISA frees up processor designers to introduce whatever innovations they like
without fear of affecting software compatibility, as long as their innovations don't
modify the ISA. An ISA is important because decouples the hardware-software
interface from the implantation. It is a contract between hardware and software
that all parties must adhere to.
When IBM selected Intel to supply the processor for the 5150, they didn't ask them
to design an implementation of an IBM's ISA. They selected a processor that was an
implementation of Intel's own x86 ISA. An ISA is not something chosen lightly, as it
only becomes harder to make changes to it with time. But given the crash nature of
the 5150, IBM's actions are understandable. But this simple choice codified the x86
ISA, which IBM neither owned nor controlled, into the standard architecture of PCs.
RISC Versus CISC
Although an ISA is rarely changed, they can be discarded if the benefits outweigh the
costs. While IBM dealt them an extraordinarily strong hand, Intel's dominance was
hardlyfait accompli. One of the significant challenges the x86 faced was from
processors with a RISC-based ISA. RISC stands for Reduced Instruction Set
Computing, and it represents a school of thought and design that was a significant
departure from the existing practices. By contrast, the x86 ISA is often referred to
as a CISC (Complex Instruction Set Computing) based design.
The key difference between RISC and CISC is the number of instructions included in
the ISA as well as complexity of the instructions themselves. When CISC processors
were first designed, the amount of memory space software occupied was critical.
(Lee, 2011) By expanding the number of supported instructions, software could be
written with fewer instructions. A good analogy is the different between the
Chinese written-language, where a single character represents a syllable, versus the
Latin alphabet, where multiple characters must be used to construct a syllable. If
paper is extraordinarily valuable, writing in Chinese is preferable, as it will require
less paper. CISC also allowed instructions to be variable in length (i.e. 4 bytes versus
10 bytes), which allowed the software instructions to not take up any more room
than was necessary.
However, as memories became larger and larger, the memory footprint of software
became less and less of a concern and instruction throughput, how many
instructions a processor can process in a second, became an industry focus. RISC is
very much aligned with this shift. The design philosophy of RISC was to reduce and
standardize the instructions in the ISA. For example, instead of a single instruction
that can read data from memory, add two numbers, and write the result back to
memory, a RISC processor would require a load instruction, an add instruction, and
finally a write instruction. But by reducing the number of instructions supported,
the circuits needed to decode the instruction became simpler. And by standardizing
instructions, such as disallowing variable length instructions, designers can
introduce innovations such as pipelines. Processor pipelines are analogous to
assembly lines, and allow multiple instructions to be operated on simultaneously. In
short, RISC designers believe a simpler ISA will enable a faster processor.
Intel faced many challenges from RISC based designs: Sun's SPARC chips, Hewlett-
Packard's PA-RISC series, Motorola's PowerPC, etc .. . The RISC versus CISC debate
also played out in academia, with much of the literature touted the performance
advantages of RISC based designs. In an industry driven by performance, this would
seem to be a decisive blow to Intel.
So why do all PCs today ship with Intel processors instead of PowerPC chips? While
there was much academic debate about the benefits of RISC versus CISC, it
ultimately came down to a business decision. Microsoft and Intel were always
careful to ensure backwards software compatibility, both in the ISA and the
operating system. There was just too much industry investment in the x86 based PC
to justify switching. (Lee, 2011)
In fact, Intel was able to close much of the performance gap through mimicking
many of the innovations first introduced in RISC based designs. For example,
without changing the x86 instruction set Intel broke up the long complicated CISC
based instructions into simpler micro-ops, allowing them to pipeline their
processors. By the late 1990's, x86 chips were meeting or beating the performance
of many of their RISC counterparts. (Mann, 1997) (Lee, 2011)
The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Moore's Law
Intel's pursuit of higher performance did not stop after its victory over RISC.
Gordon Moore, an Intel co-founder, famously recognized that the number of
transistors in an integrated circuit was doubling roughly every two years (Moore,
1965). This observation is now referred to as Moore's Law. While Moore's Law
was originally in reference to the number of transistors on a chip, it soon became
interpreted as predicting that processor performance will double. This helped stoke
a tremendous amount of focus on increasing chip performance and became
something of a self-fulfilling prophecy (Lee, 2011).
In the hunt for higher and higher performance, Intel introduced many innovations
that, while they increased performance, achieved only declining incremental
benefits. In turn these changes lead to highly complex, power-hungry designs. For
example, the initial RISC pipelines were only 5 or 6 stages long, but Intel soon
reached pipeline depths of 15 or 20 stages (Lee, 2011). This complexity comes with
a cost.
Using the pipeline example again, processors sometimes have to throw away the
instructions they are processing and start over. A longer pipeline means more
instructions queued up in their pipeline, and hence a higher penalty if the pipeline
needs to be flushed. As pipeline flushes have a higher penalty, designers will add
more logic to try to detect and avoid the hazards that trigger them. This leads to
bigger and bigger circuits, which consume more and more power all for incremental
performance gains. But the market was demonstrating an appetite for higher
performance, and this lead to tremendous pressure on engineers to keep the
performance gains coming (Lee, 2011).
Around 2003, Intel hit what is known in engineering circles as the 'power-wall'. The
power-wall refers to the amount of heat that a processor core can dissipate. Higher
performance means more heat that must be dissipated to maintain the operating
performance of the chips. As silicon circuits get hotter, their performance begins to
degrade dramatically. As Intel was running out of ways to increase processor
performance, it elected to begin designing chips with multiple processor cores on
them. With each core below the power-wall, Intel found they could keep increasing
the theoretical performance of their products (Lee, 2011) (Patterson, 2010)
Multi-core chips are predicated on the ability of software to take advantage of the
parallel processing capacity. Theoretically, software should be able to break up
tasks into operations that can be conducted simultaneously on different processor
cores. However, effective use of parallelism has proved notoriously difficult for
compilers and software writers. Parallel computing has been around for nearly 50
years, and there are countless also-rans who tried to capitalize on parallel
processing. There are only a handful of success stories, where the applications map
very well to parallel processing, such as the rendering of computer animated movies
or weather simulations. Yet, as a whole it would seem that software developers are
not prepared. (Patterson, 2010) Moore's Law marches on, but Intel may have finally
surpassed software's ability to use the additional performance.
Chapter 7 - A PC on Every Desk
The Beginnings of the PC Revolution
While the last chapter points to the IBM 5150 as the advent of the modern PC, the
roots of personal computers go back to the 1960s. On December 9th, 1968 Douglas
Engelbart gave a demonstration of a project that is now known as "The Mother of All
Demos."' In this demonstration, Engelbart presented a vision of what a personal
computer could look like, and marked the debut of the mouse, "what you see is what
you get" text editing, hyperlinks, text and graphics on the same screen, and even a
program that looks remarkably like PowerPoint.
Though much of what Engelbart demonstrated looks very familiar to a modern PC
user, it was radically different from what computing looked like in the 1970s.
Mainframes, what IBM called "Big Iron", typically did not have interactive interfaces
and would take up entire rooms. Minicomputers, such as the famous DEC PDP-8,
reduced the size of machines considerably, but were still primarily used for
computationally intense work, not for day-to-day office work. The closest product
to Engelbart's vision would be the standalone word processors, such as the Wang
1200, but even they did not encompass the breadth of functionality envisioned in
Engelbart's demonstration.
But work continued apace on the personal computer. The late 1970s is littered with
kit computers, such as the Altair computer kit and the RadioShack TRS-80, which
were popular with technicians and hobbyists. Apple was founded in this tradition,
with Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs building computers in and selling them out of
their garage (Jackson, 1997, pg. 202).
1 Tweney, Dylan "Dec. 9, 1968: The Mother of All Demos." Wired. December 9, 2008.
< http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2008/12/dayintech 1209 >
Observed on April 4, 2011.
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When IBM tiptoed into personal computers, it initially targeted sales into the
consumer market. As IBM's strength otherwise lay in the B2B market, the 5150
personal computer was distributed through a deal with Sears (Jackson, 1997, pg
203). Yet precisely because IBM was known for its business products, the IBM PC
found an enthusiastic market in office sales. After a sluggish start, IBM's sales took
off in 1982 (Reimer, 2005).
Though PCs first found their footing in the business world, the low price point
allowed a rapid expansion into the home market. IBM made a several attempts to
regain control of the IBM-PC market, such as their release of the PC jr in 19842, but
by that point the PC market was clearly in control of the clone manufacturers. Much
of this success was due to the popular Lotus 1-2-3 application. Compaq realized the
importance of the office market, and made a strategic partnership with Lotus 1-2-3
creator Mitch Kapor to sell their machines with the famous spreadsheet program
(Wilcox, 1998). By 1986, IBM and the various clone manufacturers who conformed
to the X86 ISA collectively crossed the 50% market share threshold (over
proprietary alternatives offered by Commodore, Amiga, and Apple) and never
looked back. (Reimer, 2005)
The PC Onslaught
Dating back to the founding of Microsoft, Bill Gates and Paul Allen had a vision of
computers becoming ubiquitous, perhaps best epitomized by their slogan "A PC on
every desk."3 Much of the growth PCs experienced in the early days was in this
spirit, with computers finding their way into contexts and environments where
computers had never been used before. Yet the PC also proved to be something of
an invasive species, displacing industry incumbents such as IBM itself (which later
2 IBM Archives: 1980s < http://www-
03.ibm.com/ibm/history/historv/decade 1980.html> Observed on March 28, 2011.
3 Microsoft's Tradition of Innovation <
http://www.microsoft.com labout/compannformationourbusinesses/profile.ms
px > Observed on April 4, 2 011.
diverted this business to Lenovo), Digital Equipment Company (DEC), and Wang
Laboratories. While these companies were correct that the initial personal
computer could not compete with word processors, minicomputers and
mainframes, they failed to recognize the rapidly growing threat. PCs were benefited
from Moore's law more than any other device, and it wasn't long before the PC was
in the same performance class as its beefier cousins. (Haynes, 1994)
The word processor was perhaps the first victim of the PCs success, effectively
killing the market within eight years (Haynes, 1994). The PC even chased Wang
from its lucrative hi-end markets, such as law firms who replaced their sizeable
investments in word processing systems with cheap, networked PCs (Nash, 1993).
With its core business eroded, Wang Laboratories was forced to file for bankruptcy
in August of 1992.4 The minicomputer was the next victim of the PC, and not one of
the major minicomputer manufacturers, such as Data General, Apollo Computer, and
Prime Computer, was successful in the personal computer business (Christensen
and Overdorf, 2000). No event captures this like the sale of DEC to Compaq in
January of 1998s. DEC, who gave birth to the minicomputer with the PDP-8 and
became a giant, was now owned by the company that created the first IBM-PC clone.
Not content with pushing out word processors, PCs have steadily encroached on the
territory of mainframes. Again Compaq was a pioneer: in 1989 it released
Systempro, the first PC built specifically to target the mainframe market (Martin,
1995). Initially Systempro was slow to take off, as it lagged most mainframes in
performance. Historically there has always been a performance gap between PCs
and mainframes, but PC manufacturers made serious inroads against mainframes
through a combination of lower price and increasing PC server performance
(Vijayan, 1995). Today "Big Iron" mainframes still exist, but they compete directly
4New York Times. "COMPANY NEWS; WANG STOCK AND BOND TRADING TO BE
HALTED." September 18, 1993.
s Wood, Bob "Digital Stock Price Jumps In Wake of Compaq Deal." Newsbytes.
January 26, 1998.
with machines whose lineage is in PCs. Intel's recently announced Xeon 7500
processor is specifically tailored for the enterprise computing market. Ironically,
the biggest victim of the Xeon 7500 may be Intel's own Itanium line, which was a
clean-slate architecture co-designed with HP that targeted servers and mainframes.
(Clark, 2010)
While PCs have traditionally used Microsoft's operating system, the open source
operating system Linux has been a key enabler for the PCs in the high-end server
markets. For many years, the mainframe market was populated by several variants
of the Unix operating system, such as Sun's Solaris, HP's HP-Unix, or IBM's AIX.
Linux is a free open-source operating system that while it was originally developed
on the PC, was very similar to Unix. The combination of Unix-like features and an
unbeatable price point led many customers to adopt Linux for server applications.
IBM famously embraced Linux in the early 2000s, committing to support Linux on
its systems. This allowed IBM to save on development costs while still having
enterprise level performance (Ante, 2001). The combination of Linux and PC
servers proved to be such a potent combination that Sun Microsystems was forced
to start giving away Solaris for free to preserver its market share. (Schofield, 2004).
The Commoditization of the PC
Looking back on the past thirty years, the story of the PC has been a story of
importance of the price-performance curve. Higher performance at a lower cost is a
winning combination. In each case of word processors, minicomputers, and
mainframes, the incumbents believed that their products provided superior
performance and the personal computer did not threaten their business. But
Moore's Law has been unrelenting, and as the PCs performance has increased
customers have consistently switched to the lower priced PC based solutions.
One has to look no further than Dell for importance of cost in the PC market. By
cutting out the middleman and through efficient supply-chain control, Michael Dell
was able to take his company from his dorm room to the top of the PC market. By
2004, Dell was dominant PC manufacturer, with rivals struggling to match their
production system (Grennell and Muise, 2010). With companies like Dell relentless
driving down prices and the PC conquering all the established markets, has it
become a commodity?
There is some evidence to support this. The past decade has seen mergers of former
giants, such as the merger of HP and Compaq, and other players divesting
themselves of their consumer PC divisions, as when IBM sold IBM PC to Lenovo 6.
Perhaps the best evidence for the communization of PCs is that many of the large PC
vendors now look to services, rather than market share or sales, to fuel their
corporate growth. IBM is the most prominent example of this, and their emphasis
on services was central to their turnaround, but it is also a critical also a critical part
of the strategies at consumer focused companies like Dell and Gateway (Burrows,
1999) (Grennell and Muise, 2010).
Now that the PC is ubiquitous, it is understandable that companies are looking to
new opportunities peripheral to the personal computer. But what does the future
hold for a company like Intel that has been at the core of the PC ever since its
introduction 30 years ago?
6 "Lenovo Buys IBM PC For US $1.25B." China Daily. December 9, 2004.
Chapter 8 - The Semiconductor Ecosystem in the PC Era
From Vertical to Horizontal
One of the more dramatic consequences of IBM's choice to use off the shelf parts and
the subsequent spectacular growth was the segmentation of the computer industry.
Before the PC, vertically integrated companies populated the computer industry.
Companies like IBM and Wang Laboratories designed and manufactured all the
components in the computer, designed the operating system and software, and
finally were responsible for sales. This is shown in the following image.





Fgure 6 - The Vertically Integrated Computer Industryl
Over time as the PC became more and more successful, the industry coalesced
around a very different structure. Companies like Intel and Microsoft were able to
carve out huge chunks of the value chain for themselves, and companies like
Compaq and Dell concerned themselves primarily with the assembly of machines.
The formally vertically integrated companies either fragmented from the
1 Image Source: Grove, Andrew. Only the Paranoid Survive 1996 Page 40
competitive pressure or left the business altogether. Today, the industry has what
many call a horizontal structure, as depicted in the following image.
The New Horizontal Computer Industry-
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allowed firms to focus on the areas where they could differentiate from their
competition in the same horizontal band, while also allowing them to choose the
best in class solution from their suppliers. In the vertically integrated days, in order
to compete, a company had to have a compelling solution for every level.
Increasing Performance, Decreasing Costs
Intel found it could differentiate through increasing processor performance and
driving the performance-cost curve down. Intel has pursued both of these
relentlessly. Figure 8 depicts the relative performance of Intel processors overtime.
Please note that it is a logarithmic scale, and processor performance is increasing
exponentially.
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Figure 8 - Relative CPU Performance3
This trend is truly remarkable. Every decade, Intel has been able to increase
performance by a factor of 100. And as noted in previous chapters, this has not
come with the same cost increases. If you track the performance-cost ratio, Intel's
efforts have steadily driven down the cost-per-MIPS. 4 Remarkably, it has the same
factor of 100 over a decade.
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FIgure 9 -The Price-Performance cost trends
3 Image Source: Olukotun, Kunle and Lance Hammond. "The Future of
Microprocessors." ACM Queue, September 2005. Page 28.
4 MIPS is a standard metric of CPU performance. It stands for Millions of
Instructions Per Second. However, as CPUs may have a different set of instructions,
it is an imperfect way to compare CPUs that implement different ISAs.
5 Image Source: Grove, Andrew. Only the Paranoid Survive 1996 Page 63.




This dramatic price-performance curve is the engine behind the PC's dramatic
growth and success over the past 30 years. In product category after product
category, PCs were able to demonstrate similar or better performance for a lower
price.
The reasons behind the performance gains of processors are twofold. First is the
trend to smaller and smaller geometries: the physics of semiconductors means that
transistors can be switched on and off quicker as they are made smaller. If you take
a digital circuit where the minimum transistor feature size is 130 nanometers and
then port it to a process where the minimum transistor feature size is 90
nanometers, you can run the circuit at a faster frequency, increasing its
performance. This is known as CMOS scaling. (Nowak, 2002) (Haensch et al, 2006)
The second way Intel has increased processor performance is by introducing and
exploiting parallelism in the micro-architecture. Innovations as such as pipelining,
register renaming, and superscalar processors allowed more instructions to be
processed in parallel (much of this was discussed in Chapter 6 ). It is important to
note is that these innovations neither changed the ISA nor changed the
programming paradigm. As the CPU still presented a single core to the programmer,
Intel complied with the Von Neumann view of computing, with a single processor
and a monolithic memory. The benefits to this approach are many, but most
importantly it ensured backwards and forwards compatibility. Old software
originally written on older processors would be able to take advantage of the
performance increases in newer processors, and computer manufacturers could
switch to newer processors without fear of obsolescing existing software.
However, this micro-architecture approach to parallelism is running out of steam.
Parallelism does not scale indefinitely, as almost all programs require that some
number instructions be executed in order. Adding the ability to process more
instructions in parallel does not mean that software will be able to exploit the
capacity. Figure 10 plots the relative performance per clock cycle, which is one way
to capture how much added benefit parallelism is introducing.
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Figure 10 Relative Performance per dock cycle 6
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The incremental benefits of each new innovation are decreasing, and Intel may have
fully exploited the benefits of parallelism in the micro-architecture.
The Advent of Multi-core
In addition, Intel also has to contend with the power wall, which is a way of saying
that Intel cannot increase processor core performance without exceeding the ability
to cool the core economically. In short, adding more parallelism or adding more
complexity and transistors may mean that the processor core stops working as its
temperature rises to untenable levels. The logic here is inescapable, the higher
performance of a chip, the higher its power needs, as can be seen in the trend of the
6Image Source: Olukotun, Kunle and Lance Hammond. "The Future of
Microprocessors." ACM Queue, September 2005. Page 29.
power used by Intel's products.
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Figure 11 -Intel Power Over Time7
Traditionally, Intel could have worked around the power wall by relying on smaller
process geometry to reduce the power consumption of an individual transistor,
however in the past decade Intel has shrunk transistor dimensions to the point
where passive and leakage currents now dominant the power consumption of a
processor core. This will be discussed in greater depth in the following section.
Far from letting the power wall slow their pursuit of superior chip performance,
Intel has responded by introducing multi-core designs. This allows them to claim
greater theoretical chip performance. But even though the ISA is preserved, it is a
fundamental shift from the Von Neumann model of a computer. It is not clear at
this point if software will be able to crack the multi-core nut, so to speak, and take
advantage of the available processing horsepower.
The Power-Wall
Power a driving concern in modern semiconductor design. It has already driven
Intel to switch to multi-core, and power-performance trade offs drive much of the
innovation in microprocessors today. It is impossible to overstate how important
7 Image Source: Olukotun, Kunle and Lance Hammond. "The Future of
Microprocessors." ACM Queue, September 2005. Page 30.
power consumption is and we also must understand that power is a multi-
dimensional problem.
One way to slice the problem is to look at the power performance per operation and
the power density (power consumed per unit area of silicon). For many years Intel
and other semiconductor manufacturers were able to improve power performance
while keeping power density relatively constant. (Nowak, 2002) (Haensch, 2006)
While as we saw in a previous chapter that Intel's chips have had increasing power
consumption, this relationship allowed them to pack in tremendous performance
benefits with only trivial costs to overall power consumption.
Much of this was due to the benefits CMOS scaling. If you shrank a CMOS circuit by a
factor of a, the power performance per operation would be improved by a 3 with
constant power density. However, when CMOS manufacturers were no longer able
to lower the threshold voltage with each generation of scaling (the reasons for this
are beyond the scope of this thesis), the math of power density changed
significantly. Today if you shrink a CMOS circuit by a factor of a, the power
performance per operation improves by only a factor of a, with power density rising
by a factor of a 2. In the following figure, notice how the power performance curve
has bent, providing less diminishing benefit with each successive generation, and
the power density trend has dramatically flipped directions after passing the 130
nm gate length node.
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Figure 12 -Power Performance and Power Density Trends'
With power density, an important distinction to make is between active power and
passive power in semiconductors. Active power refers to the power consumed by a
circuit in its normal operation, with transistors turning on and off. Passive power
refers to the power consumed by a circuit even if it is idle and not active. It is the
increase in passive power that is ultimately responsible for the dramatic turnaround
we see in overall power density. Even when a CMOS transistor is in the off state, a
small amount of current can leak through. As the transistor dimensions get smaller
and smaller, the leakage current can grow to a greater proportional amount of total
current And finally, when the sub-threshold voltage is not reduced as the process
8 Image Source: W Haensch, E J Nowak, R H Dennard, P M Solomon, and et al. "Silicon
CMOS devices beyond scaling." IBM Journal of Research and Development
50.4/5 (2006) Page 342.
geometry is shrunk, the leakage current consumes more and more of the total
power9 . Ultimately, this means that we have reached the point where passive
power, which used to be so low that it was literally negligible, now rivals active
power for total power consumption. Figure 13 plots active power versus passive
power density for various process geometries and projects that the two trends will
cross somewhere around 20 nanometers (Nowak, 2002). As a comparison, Intel
announced that two of their fabs are being upgraded to their next generation















Figure 13 - Active Power and Passive Power (referred to here as Subdhrehold power)"
What this all means is that CMOS scaling, as we know it, is done. The power
consumption in chips is rising too fast to cool the chips economically. The
semiconductor industry has hit the power-wall.
9 Power = Current * Voltage
10 Intel Newsroom. <
http://newsroom.intel.com/community/intel newsroom/free press/blog/2010/10
121/moores-law-around-the-world-in-bricks-and-mortar/ > Observed April 14,
2011.
11 Image Source: E J Nowak. "Maintaining the benefits of CMOS scaling when
scaling bogs down." IBM Journal of Research and Development 46.2/3 (2002).
Page 173.
The Economics of Semiconductor Costs
Anyone in semiconductor industry, whether an IDM (Integrated Device
Manufacturer) like Intel or a Fabless design company 12, is subject to some powerful
economic forces. To begin, the cost of building a new foundry, which is necessary
every time a company wants to move to a new smaller process geometry, is growing
exponentially. The graph in Figure 10 projects that a new plant built today will cost
nearly $10 Billion. These high costs are exacerbated if a company is building a
cutting edge process plant, as the R&D costs associated with developing a brand
new process are exponentially higher than if one chooses to be a "follower" (Kumar,
2008). With the required capital expenditures, it is no wonder that more companies
are choosing to shed themselves of their fabrication facilities.
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Figure 10 - Cost trend of fabrication plantsS
In addition to capital expenditures, the size of a semiconductor circuit design has a
tremendous effect on its cost structure. All semiconductors chips are cut from
standard sized silicon wafers, which the fabrication process is designed around.
When creating a design, you can get more chips per wafer by making the design
12 "Fabless" is an industry colloquialism. A plant where semiconductor chips are
fabricated is often referred to as a "fab". Therefore a company who does not own
such a plant is known as "fabless".
13 Image Source: Kumar, Rakesh. Fabless Semiconductor Implementation. 2008 Pg 16.
smaller, or you can pack more transistors (and therefore functionality) at the cost of
fewer chips per wafer. Figure 14 is a representation of this choice.
More Transistors Per Chip More Chips Per Wafer
Figure 14 -A smaller die size yields more chip per wafer
Initially it is more cost effective to pack more transistors into a chip. You get
proportionally more performance and functionality in each chip, and you have less
of the variable costs associated with each individual chip, such as assembling,
packaging, and testing. However, this has a limit Each wafer has a certain number
of defects introduced throughout the fabrication process. The larger your chip, the
more likely it is that a defect will land within the boundaries of a chip and will
proportionally affect a greater number of your chips. This proportion good chips
that come out of a fabrication process is known as the "yield", and having too large
of a chip can adversely affect the yield.
The result of these two opposing forces is a u-shaped cost curve. There is a
significant economic incentive to size your chips to be at the knee of the curve. As
processes mature, these costs curves will trend downwards, but they will not lose
their shape. Figures 15 and 16 show the cost curves over time for a 65-nanometer
process and a 45-nanometer process.
Figure 15 - 65nm Process Cost Curve14
Figure 16 - 45nm Process Cost Curve15
It is interesting to note that the knee occurs roughly around the same place, 10
million gates (roughly the equivalent of 40 million transistors). For reference, the
Intel Pentium D Processor 900 was a product of a 65 nm process with 376 million
14 Image Source: Kumar, Rakesh. Fabless Semiconductor Implementation. 2008 Pg
232.
15 Image Source: Kumar, Rakesh. Fabless Semiconductor Implementation. 2008 Pg
233.
transistors and the Intel Core 2 Duo E8300 was a made with a 45 nm process and
has 410 million transistors.16
The staggering size of Intel's chips is not a surprise. It is a direct consequence of
their relentless pursuit of raw chip performance. A goal of increased serial speed
leads to longer pipelines, look-ahead logic, and out of order operation. Incidentally
the more complex the pipelines became, the larger the penalties became for a
pipeline drained, which required sophisticated algorithms for branch prediction. In
addition, processor speeds have long been diverging from the speed of memory
which has not been improving at the same rate, which incurs a huge performance
cost for cache misses, so Intel began adding progressively larger and deeper caches
to their chips. All of this adds progressively more complexity and exponentially
more transistors. It is no surprise then that Intel finds itself an order of magnitude
away from the optimal die size. This has consequences in the forms of additional die
fabrication and processor operational costs.
The Economic Exhaustion of Intel's Business Model
Before continuing this chapter's exploration of the semiconductor ecosystem, I want
to highlight that these trends taken together indicate that Intel's historical trajectory
is no longer sustainable. Intel's success over the past thirty years has been
predicated on a tight coupling between processor design and wafer fabrication
process technology on a massive scale. Intel's relentless driving of Moore's law
forward has achieved incredible performance gains while simultaneously
dramatically lowering the cost-performance curve. These trends can be seen clearly
in Figures 8 and 9, and they are the primary reason that the PC took over computing.
Year after year, the PC was capable of more and more computing applications at a
superior cost. The performance gains from changes in the processor architecture
16 Intel Microprocessor Quick Reference Guide, <
http:/Iwww.intel.com/pressroom/kits/guickreffam.htm >. Observed on April 8,
2011.
eventually petered out (Figure 10) but Intel was still able to achieve gains through
process improvement and CMOS scaling.
However processor throughput (i.e. MIPS) is only one axis of technological
performance, and Cost per MIPS is only one way to do to a cost-performance
analysis. And now these other dimensions have caught up with Intel. While Intel is
focused in improving MIPS, Figure 11 shows us 18 years of consistent increases in
power consumption. While CMOS scaling still had runway, Intel could effectively
ignore power consumption while it provided customers with higher and higher
processor throughput. But Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the power wall dilemma
quite dramatically. Intel will now have to find radical new innovations and expend
an exponentially increasing amount of engineering effort to keep process line-width
shrinking. And even if Intel does manage this feat, it is unclear if it will provide the
same benefits like CMOS scaling use to with each successive generation.
If Intel cannot create higher and higher performance processors, can it continue to
maintain its processor prices? Figures 15 and 16 demonstrate the knee-shaped cost
curve of circuit size. There is tremendous economic pressure to be at the knee of the
curve and the size of Intel's premiere products are well beyond this point. Intel
found that customers were willing to pay a premium for more MIPS, but if Intel has
run afoul of the power-wall, we should expect prices to erode. Finally, we must
consider the explosive growth in costs to develop a new process, which Figure 10
depicts so dramatically. Can Intel justify spending $10 Billion on a new process with
eroding processor prices?
In short, Intel's business model has run out of steam, regardless of the threats it
faces from the embedded space, ARM, and low power computing. What is so
concerning for Intel is that these additional challenges are coming precisely at a
time when it is most vulnerable.
The Rise of the Independent Wafer Foundries
During the past thirty years the semiconductor industry went through a transition
similar to the PC industry's vertical to horizontal shift. The seeds for this transition
were laid in the late 1970s. It first began with a recognition that the design of a
semiconductor and the fabrication of a semiconductor could be decoupled (Baldwin
and Clark, 2000), and subsequently the respective responsibilities were divided
between different teams in an organization. At the same time, large vertically
integrated companies set up factories in the Far East for assembly and packaging
operations for semiconductors. These plants served as a "second source," which is
to say that they provided both cost and operational flexibility. A natural follow-on
was to move up the value chain and establish fabrication in the Far East, which the
Taiwanese government and Philips did with the founding of the Taiwanese
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) in 1987 (Kumar, 2008). Since then,
several other independent foundries have sprung up.
The independent foundries initially served as a "second source" for the vertically
integrated companies, but they enabled the growth of a new type of company, the
fabless semiconductor company. Instead of being a "second source" for companies
like IBM that had their own fabrication capabilities, independent foundries like
TSMC are the primary manufacturer for designs created by fabless semiconductor
companies. Since their advent in the early 90s, the fabless segment has grown at an
impressive clip. In 2006 fabless semiconductors claimed 20% of total revenues for
the semiconductor industry, and since 1994 they have an aggregate CAGR of 26% as
compared to 6% for integrated semiconductor companies (Kumar, 2008).
Furthermore, the trend towards vertical segmentation has found its way into the
design itself. Today it is common for fabless semiconductor company to only design
a portion of a chip, and license the rest of the design from 3rd party vendors. This
has come to be known as the "design ecosystem" (Kumar, 2008). One of these
vendors, ARM Holdings, will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter.
Overall, this evolution is a remarkable change that mirrors the dramatic change in
the PC industry. Figure 17 provides a timeline of the segmentation of the
semiconductor industry.
Figure 17 Evolution of the Industry17
The System on a Chip
Most fabless semiconductor companies make chips tailored for specific consumer
applications, often referred to as Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC),
rather than a general-purpose processor like Intel does.
In addition, many modern ASICs try to pull functions that might have previously
been scattered across multiple chips on to the same piece of silicon. For example,
most PCs ship with an x86 processor and a memory controller on a separate chip.
An ASIC inside of a smartphone would have these two functions integrated onto the
same chip. ASIC designs that pull system functions onto the same chip are known as
System-on-a-Chip designs (SoC).
The motivation behind this integration was originally to reduce system costs. These
ASICs were initially very small and designers could make more cost effective designs
through integration. However as we discussed above, there is cost ceiling to this
17 Image Source: Kumar, Rakesh. Fabless Semiconductor Implementation. 2008 Pg 19.
integration. There is tremendous motivation to pull in as much functionality onto a
SoC, but designers also must use their gates very judiciously.
When designing a circuit, it is helpful to think of a spectrum where on one end you
have general-purpose circuits, like a microprocessor, in the middle you have circuits
that are well suited for a certain class of applications, such as a digital signal
processor (DSP), and on the other extreme you have custom circuits designed for a
niche application. Custom circuits are hands down the cheapest way to tackle
certain applications and often have the best performance, but are limited in what
they can do. Rather than have a custom logic block for every problem that an ASIC
may be asked to solve, it may be more gate cost-effective to have a DSP, but at the
same time building a custom circuit to handle a commonly occurring task may also
be more cost-effective. As SoC integrates several circuit blocks, it can allow a
processor, a DSP, and custom logic blocks to co-exist on the same die. A SoC
approach enables ASIC designers to pick blend general-purpose and custom circuits
to help them optimize their chip to be high performance while also at the most cost-
effective size.
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Figure i8
While the integrated memory controller was used as an example above, it is actually
one of the fundamental attributes of a System on a Chip. On an Intel Processor,
memory accesses must leave the silicon for the processor, travel to the memory
controller chip on a circuit board, win arbitration, and then finally reach the DRAM
chip. Suffice to say that memory accesses are expensive operations in terms of time
and incur a significant cost on performance. Intel softens the penalty by populating
the processor with gigantic caches and pre-fetching memory before it is needed. As
SoCs are founded in a philosophy of cost-reduction, designers cannot afford to
dedicate the majority of the cache. Instead, designers bring the processor "close to
the memory" by integrating the memory controller with the SoC. (Schaffstein,
2011)
To help illustrate the System on a Chip concept, a block diagram is shown below in
Figure 19. This is an architectural representation of what is on a single piece of
silicon. This system has a full blend of general purpose and applied blocks. The
pure general-purpose logic is the ARM core in the upper left, labeled ARM7TDMI.
This system also has a DSP processor, indicated by the Oak DSP Core. Finally, the
"hardware coprocs" block refers to hardware co-processors. This and hardware
accelerators are additional ways of referring to application specific logic. While the
hardware co-processors are only one of twenty-seven blocks, they can potentially
take the most design time, as they often have to be custom designed. For much of
the rest of the chip, there exist 3rd party solutions. Also note that the majority of the
blocks are connected to the ARM bus, which is an free standard protocol ARM
provides.
Figure 19 - A sample System on a Chip block diagram's
The Advanced RISC Machine
For a company designing SoCs, ARM Holdings is a significant partner. ARM Holdings
is one of the IP vendors who participate in the "design ecosystem." Rather than
make their own chips, ARM licenses their processor cores to other fabless
18 Image Source: Furber, Steven. ARM System-on-Chip Architecture. 2000.
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semiconductor companies to integrate into their SoCs. This benefits fabless
companies as processors are often the most complex part of the silicon, and do not
do much to help a company differentiate its (designing something that is general-
purpose is by definition undifferentiated). ARM in turn benefits because it allows
them to participate in various applications where they have no expertise in the
target application.
A company that went by the name Acorn Computers Limited first developed the
ARM processor between the years 1983 and 1985. The Acorn team had decided to
develop a proprietary processor for their next line of machines, but faced the classic
engineering constraint of not enough resources or time. To meet their schedule
constraints, they elected to design a RISC processor with the goal of keeping things
as simple as possible. Thus, the Acorn RISC Machine (ARM) was born. Acorn then
changed the name to Advanced RISC Machine, and created the subsidiary ARM Ltd,
in partnership with Apple and VLSI Technologies, to sell the use of the ARM core to
other companies (Furber, 2000). When the company had its IPO in 1998, the name
was changed to ARM Holdings.
ARM found its initial success was due to its combination of low power with high
performance, a combination that made it a compelling product for the mobile and
embedded space. It also had a relatively small silicon footprint, which was crucial
for helping SoC vendors achieve their cost targets. (Furber, 2000) (Levy, 2005)
ARM also offers flexibility in its licenses. Most customers simply license the IP core
and ARM provides them with a completed net-list, while more ambitious customers
can choose to design their own implementations of the ARM Instruction Set.19 While
we cannot say with certainty what the breakdown of ARM's income is, ARM receives
payments from customers from a combination of up-front license fees and per-chip
royalties.
19 ARM.com. "Licensing ARM IP." < http://www.arm.com/products/buying-
guide/licensing/index.php > Observed May 3, 2011.
With its IP licensing model, ARM enters a partnership with its customers, and its
ultimate success is dependent on the success of its customers. To this end, ARM has
developed a suite of tools and methodologies to help speed the adoption of ARM
processing cores and to also help reduce their engineering costs. For example, ARM
offers compiler and developer tool-chains to help software developers write code
for ARM cores and has created a set of open bus protocols, the language by which
different functional blocks inside a SoC can talk to each other. Companies who
design their proprietary chips with these buses can be confident that it will be
painless to integrate them with an ARM core, and customers who are integrating IP
from several vendors knows that they can interoperate as long as they are using
ARM's bus standard, the AMBA protocols. ARM has also developed chip design
tools, such as functional models, and released them for free, all in a effort to help
their customers complete their designs quicker and with less engineering effort.
Through its own development efforts and through acquisitions, ARM has set out to
become a "one-stop shop" for its customers. (Bray, 1999) (Furber, 2000)(Portable
Design, 2008)
In the past decade, ARM has been spectacularly successful. This is largely because
one of its biggest target markets, smartphones, has exploded in the past few years.
Through a combination of engineering and market reasons that will be discussed in
the few chapters, ARM is positioned to not only continue its remarkable run, but to
grow into markets traditionally dominated by Intel. While the future is unclear, one
must ask what is the future of Intel? If the future favors ARM, can Intel adapt? And
fundamentally, can a company that has built its success on operational excellence
and cutting edge process technology compete with a company that is in a different
business altogether, IP licensing?
What is truly tragic for Intel is that they had a moderately successful ARM based
design in their XScale product line. XScale chaips were descendents of the
StrongARM design, and were ARM based solutions targeted for the mobile space.
But in 2006, Intel decided that it couldn't be successful in the embedded space, and
sold the XScale technology to Marvell so it could focus much more profitable x86
business. (Carson, 2006) (Schaffstein, 2011)
PART III
The Future
Chapter 9 - Computing Diversity
In this final third, I will lay out my prediction for the future of the computing
industry and how this will affect Intel and ARM. This chapter will discuss the
significant changes that are currently underway in the computing industry. The
coming "Internet of Things" and significant computing power being embedded in
devices, and Cloud Computing represent the two most powerful forces that are
shaping what computing will look like in the future. The smartphone and the data
center are the poster children of these industry trends and in Chapter 10 I will
examine the design constraints of these crucial markets. In particular, Chapters 9
and 10 will emphasize the critical importance of power efficiency, and the trend
towards customized System on a Chip designs. In conclusion, Chapter 11 will
explore how Intel faces a myriad of interrelated obstacles that will make it
impossible for it to continue operating as it has for the past three decades.
A Myriad of Devices
As discussed in earlier chapters, the PC has been remarkably successful. So much
that much of computing today is done on devices that can trace their heritage to the
PC. The dominance of the PC has resulted in devices, whether they are a desktop,
minicomputer or mainframe, having the same underlying PC architecture. Yet
recent years have seen the growth of devices, both in consumer devices and high
end servers, whose architectures are divergent from the Wintel monoculture that
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Figure 20 Consumer Computing Diversity'
Smartphones are the best example of this shift, and the huge popularity of the
iPhone with consumers has changed the way people use computers. However this
shift can been seen across of variety of consumer devices: tablets, e-books, handheld
gaming devices, TVs, etc... The common denominator is that these devices are
small, have a network connection, and are embedded in the daily life of consumers.
Even traditional devices are becoming more connected. HP now offers its
consumers a range of ePrint "web-connected" printers, complete with cloud
connectivity and app support. While the growth of the PC was characterized by
Microsoft's "A PC for Every Desk" mantra, the growth of embedded devices will lead
to networked devices everywhere, all powered by cloud-based services.
1 Gillett, Frank "The Age of Computing Diversity", Forrester Research, September
16, 2010, Page 10.
Figure 21 -The app enabled printer (Fromt he HP ePrint website)2
While smartphones are leading the charge, this trend will cut a wide swath. We will
see network connectivity permeating all aspects of daily life, and all these devices
will have to contend with constraints that are far removed from what traditional
PCs had to contend with. Mobile devices must satisfy a new set of design
constraints, namely size, weight, and battery life. If a smartphone was not large,
heavy, and had only 20 minutes of operational battery life, it could hardly be called
mobile. In particular, the operational battery life is a particularly vexing constraint.
Laptops, in comparison, can have a proportionally much larger battery and much
heavier weights are tolerated.
Because of these constraints, these new devices are not the descendents of the PC.
They have grown out of the embedded space, and do not lend themselves to a single
2 Image Source: HP ePrint Center. < htt://h30495.www3.hp.com/> Observed
April 13, 2011.
architecture. The constraints of the smartphone are different than the design
constraints of your TV set. The rise of the embedded space means that we are
entering an age of device diversity, with highly specialized architectures. Instead of
a single processor design being used in a huge number of different devices, we will
see highly customized SoCs only serving a handful of different products. This
development is on par with many of the historical seminal waves in computing:
mainframes in the 60s, the PC in the 80s, and networking in the 90s. (Growth
Strategies, 2005)
Servers, Cloud Computing and Data Centers
So far this chapter has focused on devices used by the end-consumer, often referred
to as client devices. But we are seeing the diversification and specialization of
servers as well. The server market used to be characterized by general purpose
servers and storage applications, but now we have machines tailored and optimized
for narrow application classes, such as virtualized servers, database servers, email
servers, etc ... (Gillett, 2010)
Today: Most systems are standard server and storage models
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Figure 22 - Diversification in Serverss
The reasons behind this specialization are numerous, but one significant factor is
the huge spike in demand for data centers. Data centers are the heart of cloud
computing, and the growth of cloud-based services has fueled further investments
into data centers and related infrastructure. The centralization of tremendous
amounts computing power introduces new design constraints, which are helping to
3 Image Source: Gillett, Frank "The Age of Computing Diversity", Forrester Research,
September 16th 2010, Page 9.
shape the specialization of server architecture. For many data centers, they are
limited in the physical footprint of the facility, which has helped fuel the trend
towards server convergence. (eWeek, 2011) In turn, high density computing has
brought forth significant operational constraints, namely powering the data center
and cooling the servers, both of which factor into the overall energy consumption.
Today in new or retrofitted data centers, efficient energy consumption is a primary
design criterion (Cappuccio, 2010).
Macro Level Forces Shaping Micro Level Architecture
Cloud computing combined with mobile devices represents a further evolution in
the architecture of networks. This evolution began with the mainframe, where
computing power was centralized in the mainframe, and many users used the same
machine. The minicomputer and the PC signified a shift towards one or few users
per machine, but having a centralized servers and mainframes to share the heavy
processing responsibilities. But relatively, the spread of computing power over the
network was a much more even distribution. Finally, mobile clients and cloud
computing are a shift back towards centralization, but with an important caveat.
Virtualization is a technology that allows multiple users to share the same computer
but still view the machine as their own private resource. In essence, a machine will
be split into N virtual machines, one for each of N users. Data centers are
centralizing computing again, but virtualization allows lightweight mobile clients to
have more private computing power available to them.
This is a major evolutionary change at the macro level, and it will enforce changes at
the micro level. The unique design constraints of mobile devices and data centers
will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, but they will have significant
impact on innovation in microprocessors. In recent years, the biggest innovation in
processor cores has been the integration of processor cores with other blocks
(Linley, 2010), and much of this integration addresses mobile devices and data
centers. Integration enables smaller form factors, higher system performance, and
most importantly more efficient use of power.
After the Wall
In the previous Chapter, I spent a great deal of time talking about the power wall,
and how it signals the end of CMOS scaling. If the power wall is an inflection point
for the industry, one must ask what is next for semiconductors?
As mentioned in Chapter 6, Intel has responded to the power wall by introducing
multi-core chips. Instead of adding complexity to a single core, which would exceed
the thermal limits of the chip, they have increased the overall performance by
adding parallelism at the processor core level. Again, this breaks the long held Von
Neumann paradigm of programming, and is a significant challenge. While software
has found effective uses for chips with a handful of cores, the problem does not
scale. It is not clear if software will be able to take advantage of the increased
processing power that Intel is adding to its chips.
Another response to the power wall is more integration, as mentioned above. By
creating special customized functional blocks, work can offloaded the processor,
allowing a lower power variant to be used. Integration can also mean mixed signal
design, where analog and digital designs are combined on the same die, such as
radio antennas or the physical interfaces for high-speed I/Os. This trend of mixed
signal design integrated with processing cores has been coined as "More-than-
Moore" (Arden, 2010). The innovation focus shifts from the digital logic, which
cannot benefit from CMOS scaling anymore, to the analog designs. One important
characteristic of analog design is that it is highly sensitive to the operating
environment and often requires customization for the application. This only serves
to further emphasize the diverse chipset ecosystem first mentioned earlier in the
chapter.
In summary, the technology trends today are emphasizing a diverse product
ecosystem and power efficient designs. Intel owes its success to the PC era, which
was characterized by the dominance of a single architecture. What does it mean for
Intel if we are now entering the post-PC era?
Chapter 10 - Where the Battle is Beinq Fought
In this chapter, we will investigate two market segments, smartphones and data
centers, that are both changing rapidly, and will likely have an outsized influence on
the continuing evolution of computers. Both of these markets are key to the rise of
cloud computing, with mobile internet devices bring network connectivity to all
aspects of daily life and data centers making tremendous computing power
available on the other end of these network connections.
Smartphones
While not the first smartphone, the iPhone was a seminal device. It was announced
in January of 20071, and signified that smartphones had potential beyond the
business market. Since the launch of the iPhone, smartphones have grown
explosively, especially with the introduction of Android based devices, and their
growth has not shown any signs of slowing down. Combined sales of smartphones
totaled 67 Million in 2010 and a recent survey indicated that consumers were more
likely to buy a smartphone than any other electronic device in 2011, including PCs
and laptops. For 2011, sales projections for smartphones top 95 Million. (Gartner,
2011)
One significant difference between mobile devices like smartphones and the
traditional PC is that they must run off a battery. The power consumption then
takes on disproportional significance because the faster you draw down your
battery, the less useful a mobile device becomes. Laptops have the same constraint,
but because of where they used (more often than not, they are used at a desk where
a power source is readily available and not on a lap) and the relative size of their
battery it is not as dominating a concern as in phones. Figure 23 shows a
comparison of power dissipation between PCs, laptops and cell phones. Cell phones
are nearly two orders of magnitude below laptops in power consumption. To be
1 Wikipedia < htt://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/lIphon >Observed April 22, 2011.
fair, smartphones require a good deal more power than their predecessors, but the
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Portability is a defining feature of mobile devices, and this is determined by keeping
overall device size and weight low. As the battery is both the largest component and
the heaviest by unit-volume, there is significant competitive pressure to keep the
battery small. This in turn makes system power efficiency an even greater
imperative. To complicate matters, batteries are subject to the square cube law.
Dimensional scaling can have a much greater impact on battery capacity, which is
determined by volume, than on something like circuit size, which is a function of
area. To help illustrate this math, imagine a battery in a cube shape. If you reduce
the battery size in each dimension by 10%, you actually loose 27% of the overall
battery capacity. This is the square cube law in action.
Thus we see enormous pressure in smartphones towards integrated SoC based
solutions, as this can have a positive effect on battery life, size, and weight. The size
benefits of a SoC are obvious, as an integrated processor, memory controller and
modem on one die will take up less room than separate dies, each with their own
packaging, and the requisite PCB circuitry required to stitch it all together. Recall
21mage Source: Kumar, Rakesh. Fabless Semiconductor Implementation. 2008. Page
128.
from Chapter 8 that with ability to blend general-purpose blocks like processor
cores and application specific logic, SoC designers can often come up with the most
cost effective circuit to achieve the performance goals of a system. Chapter 8
considered cost primarily as a function of circuit size, but circuit size is also highly
correlated with power consumption. If you are implementing a system with a
smaller circuit, you are most likely designing a system with lower power needs.
One needs look no further than the HTC Aria for example of how the combined
constraints of power, size, and weight are driving smartphone designers to integrate
more and more of their design into System on a Chip solutions. While they were
both released in the summer of 2010, the Aria is 10% shorter and nearly 20%
lighter than the iPhone 43. Another example is Apple and their purchase of the
microprocessor design companies PA Semi4 and Intrinsitys. Previously Apple had
relied on outside suppliers for their silicon, but as smartphones and tablets became
central to their corporate strategy they decided to bring design capabilities internal.
Furthermore, the SoC approach gives software dynamic capabilities to manage
power. If a chip is also equipped with a domain specific units like a Digital Signal
Processor or an application specific block like a video decoder, compute intensive
tasks can be offloaded from the core processor. This allows software to put the CPU
in low power sleep modes, not to mention that it may allow the system to get away
with an overall smaller CPU (Gwennap, 2010). ARM has enthusiastically embraced
this paradigm. In it's processor roadmap, ARM describes a vision of "Big/Little"
multi-core processing. For example, the "Kingfisher" being developed by ARM is
described as a "companion" processor and will be paired with a larger processor
3 Mobiledia.com. "HTC Aria Review." July 2010 <
http://www.mobiledia.com/reviews/htc/aria/page1.html > Observed April 23,
2011.
4 Forbes.com < http://www.forbes.com/2008/04/23 /apple-buys-pasemi-tech-ebiz-
cz eb 0422apple.html > Observed May 8, 2011.
5 Arstechnica.com < http://arstechnica.com/apple/news/2010 /04/apple-purchase-
of-intrinsity-confirmed.ars> Observed May 8, 2011.
core, such as a Cortex-A9 or its follow-on. During system operation, simple tasks
such as playing a MP3 file can be switched dynamically over to a smaller, less power
hunger processing core. (Moynihan, 2011)
Smartphones are proving significant not just because of their impressive sales. They
signify the growing sophistication of the embedded space, and its potential for
diffusion to applications traditionally dominated by PCs. One need look further than
the numerous tablet devices released in the last two years for an example. Tablets
based on PCs have struggled to gain traction for years, but with the release of the
iPad in 2010, the segment has exploded. In 2010, Apple sold 10 Million iPads,
outpacing the sales for its original iPhone 6. Close on the heels of Apple's success, we
have seen the release of tablets from Motorola, Samsung, and RIMM. What is
fascinating about these tablets is that they are all based on smartphone
architectures. Although the hardware is tightly integrated and customized, we have
seen the emergence of a new computing platform.
This platform will likely expand up into PCs as well as out into other embedded
devices. Gartner research has highlighted an emerging trend of hybrid devices that
that use smartphones and tablets as their computing engine. For example, many
devices in the home, such as home stereos or TV set top boxes, can now be
controlled via a Wi-Fi connected smartphone or tablet. This trend will only
accelerate, and we will see tighter integration between mobile devices and long
established products like cars and refrigerators (Gartner, 2011).
6 Dailywireless.org. December 29, 2010 <
http://www.dailywireless.org/2010/12/29/2010-ipad-sales-10m/ > Observed
April 23, 2011.
Figure 24 - Examples of Hybrid Devices 7
Data Centers and Servers
As smartphones came onto the scene, ARM had a distinct advantage. It had been the
dominant processor vendor in cell phones and other embedded devices, and would
likely be considered the incumbent as smartphones were first designed. With
servers, it is a different story. This is a market dominated by Intel and has aligned
well with their focus on processor performance. So why is there now so much
attention being paid to ARM's attempts to enter the server market?
In short, the way that data centers are being designed and managed is changing.
Newly constructed centers or centers that are being redesigned have a new
emphasis on increasing computing density and lower power consumption. Much of
this stems from trying to keep costs down, both in initial expenditures and
operationally. The greatest operational costs in a data center are supplying power
and cooling the center, which will only be exacerbated by denser data centers.
(Cappuccio, 2010) (Cappuccio, 2011) A data center built with power efficient
7 Image Source: Gartner Research "Tablets and Smartphones Give Rise to New
Hybrid Devices." April 12, 2011.
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processors has the dual benefits of requiring less power and generating less waste
heat that needs to be cooled. There are also pressures stemming from "Green"
pressures. Policy makers are looking for opportunities to reduce energy
consumption nation wide, and in 2006 servers and data centers consumed 61
Billion kilowatt-hours, nearly 1.5% of total US electricity consumption. (Brown,
2010)
Thus is it is no wonder that we have seen a spate of systems and chips aimed at the
server market all using ARM processors. Caixeda, a Texas startup formerly known
as Smooth-Stone, is building servers with ARM at its core8 . Not to be left out, SoC
giant Marvell is also developing ARM-based silicon for use in servers9. NVidia has
garnered a great deal of attention with its announcement of a chip that will combine
its GPU cores with ARM cores for use in both PCs and high performance servers.
The prospect of ARM based servers has also benefited from support in an unlikely
place. Recognizing the potential shift underway, Microsoft has announced that the
next version of Windows will run on both x86 and ARM ISAs (Wall Street Journal,
2011).
Energy efficiency is clearly growing in importance, but what about the functional
requirements of the server market? Many doubt that low powered processors from
mobile devices have the required features to make their way into servers (Shilov,
2011). For example, while 32 bit addressing is sufficient for mobile devices, it is not
sufficient for high-end servers where most processors support 64 bit addressing.
Currently, neither Intel's low power processor line ATOM nor ARM support 64 bit
addressing. Virtualization is another critical technology, especially for cloud-based
services where users need to be isolated from other users. Yet, many of these
8 Gigaom.com "Smooth-Stone Bets ARM Will Invade the Data Center", April 9, 2010 <
http://gigaom.com/2010 /O4/O9/smooth-stone-bets-arm-will-invade-the-data-
centerl > Observed April 23, 2011.
9 EE Times. "Marvell plans 40-nm ARM server processors." <
http: //www.eetimes.com/electronics-news/4199239 /Marvell-ARM-Servers >
Observed April 23, 2011.
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critical features will come to mobile devices, even without the pressure from the
server market. ARM has clearly laid out that 64 bit processors are in their product
roadmap (Schaffstein, 2011). Virtualization is making its way into mobile devices,
largely stemming from the demands of the banking industry, who desire greater
security as more financial transactions occur on mobile devices (Lee, 2011).
However, the server market still highly prizes raw CPU throughput and
performance. While data centers designed around a large numbers of ARM cores
versus a smaller number of high performance x86 Xeon processors might be more
power efficient, some applications will still require "Brawny" processor cores
(Holzle, 2010). So it is still not clear if ARM will successfully outflank Intel in the
server space. ARM certainly provides a compelling power story, but it also must
compete with Intel on CPU throughput, an arena Intel is well accustomed to. The
answer will only be revealed with time, but Intel must take this threat to its most
profitable segment seriously.
Chapter 11 - ARM and Intel In the New Microprocessor Ecosystem
In this chapter the multifaceted challenges Intel will be discussed at length, and the
arguments herein will draw on much of what has be discussed in previous chapters.
We will begin with an analysis of the obstacles currently faced by Intel in their core
technologies as they grapple with shifting from processor performance to processor
energy efficiency and the losing economics of cutting edge processor fabrication.
We will then discuss the technical ecosystem at large, and why Intel struggles with
highly integrated products and product design. Finally, we will investigate why
Intel has fundamentally the wrong business model to compete in a world with
diverse, integrated system architectures.
The Challenges In Microprocessors
The Architectural Complexity Problem
As discussed in Chapter 8, Intel's pursuit of greater processor performance has left
them with a legacy of very large and complex implementations of x86 ISA. Much of
the innovations introduced in the 1990s, such as out-of-order execution or wide and
long super-scalar pipelines, came at the cost of greater architectural complexity
with minimal performance gain. The combination of switching to multi-core
designs and the rise of mobile applications caused Intel to seriously tackle the
problem of power consumption.
Thus in 2004, Intel kicked off a project, codenamed Bonnell, to design a low power
processor core that could be used as the key building block for multi-core chips.
The project was given to a design team based in Austin, Texas (which is home to
Mount Bonnell), whose previous project was ironically a power hungry variant of
the Pentium 4 processor family. While their previous project was cancelled, Bonnell
went on to become what is now known as the ATOM processor (Shimpi, 2008).
When the ATOM processor was launched, it came in a variety of packages with a
TDP1 range of .65 to 13 Watts 2. For comparison, the Intel Core 2 Duo family runs
from 5 Watts to 150 Watts.3 So what is different about the ATOM processor? There
are a myriad of design changes, but at its essence much of ATOM's design was taking
the existing x86 designs and scaling it back. ATOM has a 2 issue super-scalar
pipeline, which means two instructions can be processed at once, while most x86
processors at that time were 3 or 4 issue. The ATOM processor has almost no ability
to execute instructions out of order, except for the most narrow of cases. You may
recall from Chapter 6 that x86 was able to mimic the pipeline of RISC designs by
breaking up instructions into micro-ops. In contrast, the Bonnell design team
stripped out most of these micro-ops and treated many x86 instructions as single
operations. (Shimpi, 2008)
What is so fascinating about these design decisions is that they are a deliberate
rolling back of many of the architectural innovations introduced to improve
processor performance. They were simply too expensive to keep in the processor
core. To be fair, the ATOM line does have many design features that are not a direct
contradiction of the innovations of the past, such as larger cache cells for lower
power and a binary clock distribution scheme. The ATOM processor spends only
10% of its power budget on clock distribution, while large contemporary CPU cores
can spend up to a third of their power. (Shimpi, 2008)
ATOM is certainly an achievement for the Bonnell team. They created an x86 with
dramatically lower power consumption than other Intel x86 products. But is it
enough? Despite the major design shifts, ATOM does not beat ARM based
processors in either active or idle power consumption (Shimpi, 2008). Intel would
1 TDP stands for Thermal Design Point or Thermal Design Power. It is a measure of
the maximum power a processor core is expected to draw running real applications.
Source: Wikipedia
2 Intel.com Observed April 19, 2011.
3 Wikipedia: Intel Core 2 < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/lntel Core 2 >, Observed
April 19, 2011.
claim that the power gap will narrow with further generations of the ATOM
processor. But the Christen disruption framework discussed in Chapter 1 argues
that companies will struggle to create products that are competitive in a new
performance dimension, which is in this case is power. And there are tell tale signs
of trouble here.
For example, the ATOM processor has a pipeline of 16 stages, while the Core 2 Duo
has 14 pipeline stages. Longer pipelines are associated with higher complexity,
higher performance, and greater power consumption. While some of the stages are
the result of design decisions made to lower power, several other stages are
required to support simultaneous multi-threading and the clock frequencies of
ATOM, or in other words the pipeline reached this length in an effort to achieve
performance targets. (Shimpi, 2008) A more human tell-tale sign of Intel's trouble
may be the departure of Anand Chandrasekher, the VP of the Ultra-Mobility Group
and closely associated with the ATOM line, from Intel this past March.4 This has led
many to question Intel's dedication to the mobile space.
Company Culture's Influence on Technical Design Decisions
At this point, the discussion will turn to how organizational history and culture can
influence how design teams approach a problem and influence their decisions.
Much of this is rooted in Chapter 5, and its discussion of the role of culture. The
salient example is Polaroid, who failed to bring a compelling digital camera to
market despite having an enormous technical lead.
When an engineering team approaches a design parameter, such as the power
consumption of the core, there are several ways to frame the problem. On one end
4 Intel Newsroom. <
http:I/newsroom.intel.com/community/intel newsroom/blog/2011/03/21/chip-
shot-anand-chandrasekher-to-leave-intel-mike-bell-dave-whalen-to-lead-ultra-
mobilitv-group > Observed April 20, 2011.
of the spectrum, you can view it as a constraint that needs to be worked around or a
condition that must met in order to focus on your other goals. Further along
spectrum, a team can view a constraint as a trade-off point. For Intel, shifting from a
constraint-based view to a trade-off approach would be the difference between
stating a TDP target that an overall core must come in below, versus setting an
instruction-per-watt target for the core. As power has become the primary concern
in their target market, Intel has made an important shift. The Bonnell team adopted
a rule of thumb where a performance improvement of 1% could only implemented
if it increased power consumption by 1% or less (Shimpi, 2008).
But even though they are now focused on the power-performance trade off, Intel
still carries with them the legacy of their previous mental models. The 1% for 1%
rule of thumb still treats power consumption as a tax to be paid for increased
performance. Contrast this with the ARM design team, who tackled the power
constraint from the other end of the spectrum. Rather than considering power
consumption to be a challenge to be overcome, they made it an explicit design goal
to be a low power processor core early in the history of the ARM processor (Levy,
2005). Over time they have come to the same trade-off view as Intel, but they have a
cultural legacy of low power design and focus. As a result, the ATOM product line
has had to focus on bringing power consumption down in order to meet the design
constraints of mobile devices, while ARM can focus on narrowing the performance
gap between their product and Intel's. If we were to view this again through the lens
of a Christensen disruption, Intel's existing customers and existing value network
force them to put overall performance first, while ARM's own value network forces
them to never take their eye of designing low power products.
The Commoditization of Wafer Fabrication
In Chapter 9 we discussed the "power wall" at length and what it means for CMOS-
scaling. CMOS-scaling is the technique of shrinking a circuit along all dimensions by
the same relative factor. The dimensions of a transistor designed for a 180
94
nanometer process are proportionally the same as a transistor designed for a 130
nanometer process. Intel has relied on CMOS-scaling as a powerful tool to
dramatically increase processor performance while keeping product costs relatively
constant. However as was discussed earlier CMOS-scaling has run out of steam and
as Intel transitions to smaller and smaller geometries, the final product advantages
are shrinking. The compelling argument for CMOS-Scaling was that it allowed the
fabrication process to advance and mature without incurring a high cost on the
design of a circuit. There are theoretical options to shrink circuits beyond the
power wall, such as FinFETs or Silicon-On-Insulators designs, but these are
fundamental shifts in the transistor design. Any transition to new transistor and
gate design will now extract a significant design cost (Nowak, 2002) (Haensch,
2006).
What all this means is that it will require exponentially more effort and more
investment for Intel to maintain a process advantage over other wafer fabricators,
and even if it does so, the payoffs may not be worthwhile. Pure-play foundries like
TSMC and UMC have dramatically improved their capabilities and shrunk the
process advantage that Intel has struggled to maintain. In their currently operating
facilities, Intel's leading edge process is 32 nanometers5 , and has announced the
construction of a 14 nm fab6 . In contrast, TSMC currently offers a 40-nanometer
process and is developing a 20-nanometer process7 .
s Intel Newsroom. <
http://newsroom.intel.com/community/intel newsroom/free press/blog/2010/10
/21 /moores-law-around-the-world-in-bricks-and-mortar/> Observed April 20,
2011.
6 Intel Newsroom, "Intel to Invest More than $5 Billion to Build New Factory in
Arizona", <
http://newsroom.intel.com/community/intel newsroom/blog/2011/02/18/intel-
to-invest-more-than-5-billion-to-build-new-factory-in-arizona> Observed April 20h,
2011
7 TSMC.com, Observed April 20, 2011.
While Intel has always maintained a technological lead with smaller performance
geometries, independent foundries such as TSMC are matching Intel in the
transition from 300mm wafers to 450mm wafers. A larger wafer allows more die to
be cut from the same wafer and can ultimately lead to cost reductions ranging from
an initial 10% up to a potential 50% cost advantage over 300 mm wafers, the
current industry standard. (LaPedus, 2011) (Kumar, 2008) This is a telling
difference, as a larger wafer does not offer any performance advantage like a smaller
geometry. It is clear independent foundries are focused on commoditizing
semiconductor fabrication, and are content to cede the performance bleeding edge
to Intel. The escalating difficulty of maintaining a process advantage while
simultaneously facing rapid commoditization of previous generations puts Intel in a
difficult spot.
The Challenge In Modular Design
The NRE Economy
Recall that in Chapter 9, I outlined the move to diverse integrated product
architectures, which in turn requires more specialized components like System on
Chip designs instead of generic microprocessors. But doesn't customization incur a
cost? This is one of the most fundamental lessons in economics. Henry Ford was
able to achieve mass-market success with the Model T by standardizing the product
and exploiting the inherent cost advantages in mass production. If the future is one
of custom designs and smaller niche volumes, wouldn't this open a window for Intel
to compete on price? Why don't customized designs incur higher costs?
The first part of this answer is that the semiconductor industry long ago decoupled
fabrication. Intel does optimize its plants for long runs of the same product, but
TSMC and other independent foundries specialize in doing short runs of different
products for different customers (Gwenapp, 2010). By grouping customers by their
selected process technology, foundries can make a different product simply by
swapping the design masks. The cost differential in manufacturing from mass
production is largely negligible. Furthermore, a customized component may result
in a significantly lower overall system cost. For example, if a system uses a lower
power custom SoC over a generic processor, the system cooling requirements could
be lower, allowing a manufacturer to save on total system cost.
But customization does incur higher design costs. In industry terms, any
engineering costs incurred during the design of a chip, from digital logic design, to
test design, to layout, is referred to as non-reoccurring engineering, or NRE. The
drivers and consequences of NRE are complex. The more complex a design, the
higher the NRE will be. And the larger the volumes of a chip sold, the less the NRE
matters in the final cost structure of the product. When Intel designs a cutting edge
processor, the NRE is amortized over hundreds of millions of units. But when you
design a SoC customized for a niche application, the NRE is a significant factor.
Further more, as process geometries shrink, NRE costs increase as a rule, regardless
of the step in the design process. Figure 25, plots these various costs, such as the
design, verification, and software costs.
Figure 25 - The costs assodated with al aspects of design are increasing"
The semiconductor industry has responded to this through the modularization of
designs, and tools focused on reducing NRE. The most prominent example of this
are the 3"d party IP vendors. Instead of designing all parts of the SoC from scratch, a
8 Source: Kumar, Rakesh. Fabless Semiconductor Implementation. 2008. Pg 235.
robust IP market has evolved where functional blocks can be licensed and
integrated into the design. By selling a design across to multiple companies, IP
vendors can often offer their design at a lower cost than the NRE a company would
incur designing the IP them selves. Furthermore, new design always incurs a risk
that it will not work as expected. As their product is used in a variety of products,
3rd party IP vendors often present a less risky choice for SoC designers. ARM is the
most visible and most successful of the 3rd party IP vendors. The modularization of
semiconductor design is ARM's raison d'itre.
When a company can license from a market of proven IP designed common
applications, they can also focus their engineering efforts on differentiating design.
Recall the "Good NRE" and "Bad NRE" discussion from Chapter 1. A modular design
ecosystem allows design teams to more effectively deploy their engineering
resources and achieve a better balance of Good NRE and Bad NRE. This is evocative
of the "small footprint" strategy described in Chapter 4. (Baldwin and Clark, 2006)
The fabrication ecosystem has also evolved to reduce NRE. Companies like UMC and
TSMC charge companies an initial fee for each new design, known as the mask fee,
which can significantly drive costs up if multiple revisions are needed to perfect a
design. To help mitigate the risk of higher NREs, fabless semiconductor companies
often offer a "shuttles." A shuttle lets multiple customers share the same wafer and
costs significantly costs a full mask set fee. A customer cannot go to production with
a shuttle chip, but it does allow them to build a low cost prototype and provide early
samples to software developers in turn. Shuttles help reduce overall NRE costs and
improve the time to market.
System Optimization
As we enter the era of computing diversity, each device will have its own unique
combination of performance capabilities and features. In addition, the
semiconductors designers create to power these devices must choose between the
iron triangle of tradeoffs of power, performance, and cost. The upshot of highly
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integrated customized components is that it makes it a much easier proposition to
optimize the overall system. The modular design ecosystem allows device
manufacturers to choose a combination of best in class IP blocks. While Intel may
release a version of ATOM coupled with a H.264 decoder, a custom SoC can combine
a standard ARM processor with any decoder a customer chooses. Intel's offerings
bring to mind the saying "you can choose any color, as long as its black." (Demerjian,
2011)
Again the foundries contributions to the ecosystem are helping designers optimize
the total system. All the major independent foundries offer different sets of library
gates that help tailor the circuit for different applications. For example, after it
passed the 90 nanometer process node TSMC started offering Low Power (LP) and
General Purpose (GP) libraries. The GP was fast but power intensive, and the LP
was slower. SoC designers would choose a library that best matched their target
application. In addition TSMC now supports mixed library designs, where some
portions of the chip can be built with different sets of library gates, allowing for
greater customization and system optimization. In short, independent foundries
and the 3rd party IP market have greatly reduced the required NRE to design a new
customized chip. And with the ability to customize each designer can choose the
combination of speed, power, and cost that best satisfies their design constraints
(Schaffstein, 2011).
Developer Tools and Environments
Intel boasts a great deal of industry tool support, but most of that is relegated to
software development tools, such as compilers, and hardware drivers. On the other
hand, the fabless semiconductor industry boasts a wide selection of semiconductor
design tools, addressing all aspects of the design process. These tools run the gamut
from logic design simulators, to circuit power optimization. Thus when building a
SoC, designers can avail themselves of a wide selection of software tools to help
optimize their design, reduce NRE, and improve time to market. (Schaffstein, 2011)
Furthermore, the fabless semiconductor enjoys excellent tool-chains to support
software development. Much this comes from the market position of ARM, with
much if its industry support and adoption stemming from the fact that it is the
dominant processor core vendor for fabless semiconductor companies. But ARM
has also deliberately cultivated excellent software support and enabled developers
to quickly write software for ARM processors. (Lee, 2011) (Levy, 2005)( "CEO
Interview: Warren East ARM", 2008)
The support of software developers is a critical point. As Intel tries to move into the
mobile space, it is trying to displace a processor ISA that enjoys wide adoption.
Recall from Chapter 6 that the primary reason that Intel was able to fend off the
challenge from higher performing RISC processors in the PC was because of the
tremendous amount of software that was already compatibility with the x86 ISA.
Has ARM reached the software compatibility tipping point? It is telling that
Microsoft, the other giant of the PC industry and perhaps the software company
most closely tied to the x86 architecture, demonstrated the next version of Windows
will run on an ARM processor 9. Furthermore, Microsoft also acquired an ARM
architectural license, signaling their intention to begin designing their own SoCs.10
The Challenge With the Business Model
Vertical Versus Horizontal
In many ways, the challenges that Intel currently face mirror the Intel's rise to
dominance with the advent of the PC. Before the PC companies that designed and
manufactured all the components in the computer, such as IBM or DEC, dominated
the industry. The open modular architecture of the PC allowed companies like Intel
9 ZDNet.com. January 5,2011 < http://www.zdnet.com/blog/microsoft/ces-
microsoft-shows-off-windows-8-on-arm/83 39 > Observed April 20, 2011.
10 Clarke, Peter. "Microsoft-ARM deal is a consumer, computing game-changer." EE
Times. July 23, 2010 < htt://www.eetimes.com/electroncs
news/4204864/Microsoft-ARM-deal-game-changer > Observed April 20, 2011.
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and Microsoft to carve out large chunks of the value chain for themselves. We are
seeing the same pattern play out again with the highly segmented semiconductor
industry and SoC design. Is a conflict of vertically integrated companies versus a
horizontally segmented ecosystem.
Just like Intel didn't have to excel at hard drive design, or write operating systems,
the 3rd party IP vendors allow SoC designers to focus on the portion of their design
that differentiates themselves from their competition. And in return 3rd party
vendors like ARM benefit regardless of a products' ultimate design. Through its
licensing model ARM can participate in a variety of target applications where it has
almost no domain knowledge. Intel, in contrast, must limit itself to targeting a
handful of applications that will yield the greatest volumes. In short, Intel has to
make a few well-targeted bets, while ARM can flood the market with different SoC
designs and nearly no costs to themselves.
For companies further up the value chain, such as mobile handset manufacturers or
mainframe suppliers, there is a powerful incentive to pursue a "second-source"
strategy for components in their supply chain. Second sourcing means exactly what
it says. If you have more than one source for a component, you have more leverage
in price negotiations. If a company designs an x86 ATOM based SoC into their
design, they likely are dependent on Intel exclusively, with the outside possibility of
switching to an offereing from AMD. However, given ARM's widespread adoption by
a variety of companies, there is no shortage of ARM suppliers to choose from. And
while SoCs are rarely "socket compatible" with each other due to customization, a
device manufacturer can swap ARM SoC suppliers in each new product generation
without breaking software compatibility.
The Losing Economics of Fab Development
With the costs of building cutting edge rising exponentially, many companies are
asking if they can afford to keep their own fabs. In addition, with the power-wall
standing firm, radical new transistor designs and methodologies needed, such as the
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aforementioned FinFET or Silicon-On-Insulator paradigm shifts. This will create
further costs as the industry shifts from its traditional CMOS designs.
This is one of the driving reasons behind the emergence of the "fab-lite" company.
Many previously integrated semiconductor companies are now shedding
themselves of their fabs and are now using partnerships with either other vendors
or independent foundries to develop new fabrication processes. A famous example
is the other x86 company AMD, who spun off their foundries into a new independent
company in 200811.
Intel has employed a "Tick-Tock" product roadmap to introduce new process
generations. New process geometries are broken in using a "Tick" product, which is
an established product that is ported to the new process. In this way, they hedge the
risk inherent in a new process by porting an established design. In the "Tock"
phase, they create a new design for the now semi-mature process. This design in
turn may be used as the following generation's "Tick" project (Kumar, 2008). It is a
clever way to align product roadmaps with process roadmaps, but when a new
process also incurs radical new design paradigms at the gate level, Intel may have to
acclimate to a much higher level of risk with their "Tick" projects.
Cannibalization and Competition
Competitively, Intel faces a myriad of challengers, including itself. As low power
processors are adopted for use into servers, Intel faces the unappealing reality that
their low margin ATOM processors could be stealing business from their very
profitable Xeon line (Demerjian, 2011)
Furthermore, the competitors outside of Intel are fragmented. Intel is competing
with ARM on the ISA, TSMC and the independent foundries on process innovation,
and a plethora of SoC companies (Marvell, Qualcomm, NVidia, Samsung, Apple,
11 The Inquirer.net < http://www.theinguirer.net/inguirer/news/1019627/amd-
foundry-spinoff-details > Observed April 20, 2011.
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MediaTek, etc ... ) for design wins. These competitors also feed off each other.
More firms choosing to outsource fabrication creates opportunities for ARM, and in
turn the market dominance of ARM will drive more companies to try their hands at
SoC design. Instead of competing with other vertically integrated companies such as
the AMD of old who had their own strengths and flaws, Intel cannot afford to miss a
step any segment. In contrast, by not asserting itself too strongly and providing best
in class power performance, ARM has quietly made itself ubiquitous. (Turley, 2010)
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Conclusion
The Intel Age of Computing is over. While it is a transition that will happen slowly,
the x86 instruction set is no longer the dominant architecture of computing. It has
been done in by a combination of architectural innovations, technological realities,
and innovative business models. Intel as we know it is doomed.
Power has become a dominant performance indicator at precisely the moment Intel
is most vulnerable. If CMOS-scaling had not run headfirst into the power-wall, Intel
would likely be able to use its process advantage to drive power consumption down
without making any changes to the architecture. As consumer attention shifts to
power-efficiency, processor performance is no longer valued as highly. Incredibly
complex and large circuits are required to continue to push the performance
envelope. Intel must charge significant premiums to cover both the per-unit cost
and the staggering capital expenditures to build a cutting-edge fabrication plant.
Cost and energy efficiency pressures and the rise of a diverse class of embedded
systems will continue to push along the transition to System on a Chip solutions.
System on a Chip designs customized for their applications can only exist in an
ecosystem that embraces the third party IP and independent foundries. Intel's
business model is incompatible. It is predicated on co-specialization of design and
manufacturing extracting huge amounts of value from the entire chain, from initial
design efforts to the finished components.
As a result, Intel is all but locked out of a vibrant new computing segment and one
that promises to have outsized impact, perhaps as much as the first IBM 5150. As
the struggle to come up with a compelling story for smartphones, their most
lucrative market is at risk as ARM makes a challenge to the dominance of the Xeon
product line in high-end servers. As embedded devices continue to grow upwards,
much like the PC did thirty years ago, all of Intel's business becomes at risk. There
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are signals from the market that this shift is already happening. Some inside
sources are now claiming that Apple is going to phase out Intel processors from its
laptop line in favor of ARM1.
Intel's problem is exacerbated by the fact that the investments required are so
lopsided. Each successive generation of fabrication plants is exponentially more
expensive. Intel announced that its newest fab will cost $5 Billion 2, and that does
not include the massive R&D investments required to develop the process. Just
recently, Intel announced that their next fab will also build circuits using the fin-FET
3-D transistor design3 . This is a massive bet, and represents a significant transition
for Intel. However, it was a necessary bet to make if Intel wanted to continue
focusing on circuit speed. This announcement is not surprising, as Intel has prided
themselves on their advanced processes. (Recall the marketing campaign centered
around dancing wafer process engineers in their clean suits). But if fin-FET designs
prove to be a painful transition, what then? When the economics catch up with
them, will they be able to divorce themselves from their fabrication plants?
So what is Intel to do? First it must recognize that the dominant design has already
crystallized for smartphones, tablets, and by extension the embedded space. While
it might seem counter-intuitive to have a dominant design in an industry that will be
characterized by customized device, the dominant design takes the form of a System
on a Chip with one or more ARM cores, an integrated in memory controller, and a
combination of 3rd party IP blocks and application specific logic. If Intel wants to
participate in this market, it must embrace the dominant design.
I Demerjian, Charlie. "Apple dumps Intel from laptop lines" SemiAccurate.com, May
5, 2011 < http://semiaccurate.com /2011/05/05/apple-dumps-intel-from-laptop-
lines!.> Observed May 7,2011.
2 Bloomberg News. February 18, 2011 < http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
02-1 8/intel-plans-to-build-5-billion-chip-plant-in-arizona-hire-4-000-workers-html
> Observed April 23, 2011.
3 Markoff, John "Intel Increases Transistor Speed by Building Upward." New York
Times, May 4,2011 < http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/science/05chip.htm
> Observed May 6, 2011.
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Intel must not only participate in licensing their IP to other silicon vendors, but they
must develop a library of IP to license outside of processor cores. And any SoC they
design must primarily feature an ARM processor core if they want it to gain any
traction. Intel clearly made a mistake when they gave up on their own ARM
implementation and sold XScale to Marvell. If they want to have a chance in the vital
embedded space, they must embrace modular design, admit their losses and become
an ARM licensee, and be willing to outsource the semiconductor fabrication. In
short, they must turn their business upside down. However, they continue to make
money from PCs, laptops and servers for the time being. The Christensen disruption
framework would say that this is nearly an impossible feat to pull off, as the value
network Intel has built up over 30 years would pull it in exactly the opposite
direction.
Intel must embrace the commoditization of wafer fabrication. There are some signs
that this is already happening, as Intel has agreed to fabricate FPGAs for two
startups, Achronix and Tabula 4. The volumes of these deals are drops in the bucket,
but they are a dramatic departure for Intel. As volumes in their old fabrication
plants wind down, Intel can fill their capacity by bringing on more fabless
semiconductor companies as customers. However, the FPGA customers may be as
much about trying to find a workable platform for the ATOM processor than a try
venture into the pure-play foundry market. Another rumor that has only surfaced in
the last week is that Intel is trying to woo Apple away from Samsungs. The irony of
this rumor is that if Intel does succeed, they would be building ARM processors. If
Intel does commit itself to the foundry market, it will have to maneuver carefully to
avoid conflicts of interests. Intel is such a large company that one would have to
4 SemiAccurate.com. "Intel picks up a second foundry customer, Tabula." April 18,
2011 < http://semiaccurate.com /2011 /04/18/intel-picks-up-a-second-foundry-
customer-tabula/ > Observed April 23, 2011.
s Barak, Slyvie. "Could Intel Churn out ARM chips for Apple?", RCR Wireless. May 4,
2011 < http://www.rcrwireless.com/article/20110504/CHIPS/ 10509966/0 >
Observed May 6, 2011.
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imagine that any business that a foundry division could win would be in turn
competing with some other Intel offering, not to mention that Intel would face a
tremendous headache managing their plant capacity between supplying their own
products and meeting their obligations to their foundry customers.
AMD may very well be a picture of Intel in 10 years. In a move that shook up the
industry, AMD had to give up on owning its own fabs, as they became too expensive
to maintain. Two years ago, AMD spun all of its plants into an independent
company, GlobalFoundries6. Today, AMD is the subject of a rash of rumors, and
there is much speculation that it may become an ARM licensee. As a company that
was focused on capturing a market defined by Intel, this is a significant
development. But many believe that this moment is a paradigm shift, and it would
make sense for AMD to abandon x86. AMD famously became the second source for
x86 at the advent of the PC because IBM would not give Intel their business without
an access to a second source, but today if AMD feels the "x86 architecture is not
worth second-sourcing what does that say about the value of the first-source chips?"
(Clarke, 2011)
Beyond the questions of technology and design strategies, if Intel is to survive, it
must change its culture. The examples of IBM and Polaroid have shown how critical
culture is. Lou Gerstner famously said, "I came to see, in my time at IBM, that
culture isn't just one aspect of the game - it is the game." For the past three decades,
it has been the center of gravity for computing hardware. No other company can
match their operational acumen and capabilities. This is a bitter pill for anyone to
swallow. The Intel Age is over. Time will tell if it is the end of Intel as well.
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